The book describes not only one of the most successful operations of the Soviet army, but also its prehistory - battles in the same places in the fall of 43 - in the spring of 44. Reconnaissance did not reveal the German defenses, each time - hasty preparation, interaction of infantry with tanks (and artillery) - it is known what, the secrecy is not respected. Therefore, it is not in vain that the author recalls the Somme and Paschendal, and I completely agree with him in this. Even with a lot of shells and tanks, even 44 repeats the scenario of the 17th. The Germans complain about the dirt, because of which their weapons fail, they fight back with melee weapons and grenades. But at the same time, they shoot under three thousand tons (!) Of shells per day, winning the counter-battery fight. Including from 280-mm mortars PMV with 205 kg projectile (I don't know why - probably just a "shob bulo", 210-mm is much more convenient). Tigers and Hornisse knock out tanks from great distances. Massaging rocket launchers. The bottom line is that there is almost no need to talk about success. But operations continue after the breakthroughs (again, see 1917) ...
"Bagration" - "heaven and earth". Thorough preparation at the same terrain training grounds in the rear, working off to automatism. Zeroing from special places to the side (and the allies knew how without it, by the way). Infantry weapons - machine guns are supplemented to 146 140% and more. The exit of the tanks is covered by the noise of the bombers' engines (who said Amiens?). Opening of most German batteries. Moreover, some of the German heavy guns, aviation, tanks are waiting for the Lvov-Warsaw strike in the Ukraine.
"It was then that the card went to me." The German defense is simply torn to shreds, the aviation, in spite of the weather, persistently searches for and strikes targets, including artillery, reconnoiters. Smoke and phosphorus shells. The infantry rushes through three rows of trenches, gets out and takes batteries (Amiens-2). Garrisons throw pillboxes and run away. Special groups capture bridges. And it was here that tank brigades with proactive commanders show what they are capable of in the best traditions of the theories of the 30s - they cut the retreat paths, the German columns are regularly arranged just a mini-hell (photos of the columns scattered into the trash are attached). And then the Il-2 swooped in (there are 32 fighters for the entire army group) and the picture repeats itself. All around treason. Goering orders the He-177 to chase the Russian tanks (and this is already the mirror of the 41st). The Hells Angels Motorcycle Guards Regiment claims the destruction of 3,000 soldiers and officers, 566 prisoners, with 112 killed and 193 wounded. 28th tank brigade - 53 killed of its own, 3570 aliens, 1422 - prisoners. 735 SAP - 1900 Germans with their 13 killed and 11 wounded.
It is interesting that such a success was determined, among other things, by the release of forces from the Crimea and better weather than a warm winter or spring. Had the winter offensive been even better prepared, they could (according to Isaev) perhaps have recaptured Vitebsk - instead of the collapse of the army group. It is interesting how the equipment with powerful tractors and trucks (aka Lend-Lease) influenced - the use of RGK artillery against "fortresses" is noted literally right off the bat.
In the first 12 days of Operation Bagration, from June 23 to July 4, 1944, Soviet troops, having broken into the enemy's defenses, defeated the main forces of Army Group Center, advanced from their initial position to the meridian west of Minsk by almost 240 km. This gave an average daily rate of advance of about 20 km per day. Such a crushing defeat seemed almost unbelievable. So incredible that they doubted the Soviet successes, and as proof of the reality of reports from Belarus in Moscow, they drove out columns of newly taken prisoners. The dull mass of soldiers in caps turned out to be the most convincing proof of the reality of the just catastrophe of the German army.
German prisoners of war walking along the Garden Ring became one of the most famous and significant events of the war in general and the summer of 1944 in particular. The accumulation of knowledge about that period forced us to take a fresh look at seemingly well-known personnel. The columns wandering around Moscow differed from the discordant and shabby crowd of "Volkssturmists" and "Hitler Youth" of 1945. The German generals who headed the columns of prisoners, at first perceived as rather abstract figures of the defeated enemy commanders, were identified over the years, and each of them had its own story.
In the first row of the column along the Moscow street that afternoon on July 17, 1944, there were three generals, they, in fact, led the procession of the "parade of the vanquished." In the middle walked a dryish general in a cap, with a cane and an overcoat thrown over his arm. His name was Paul Voelkers, and his last position was the command of the XXVII Army Corps. He led the corps from the summer of 1943. It was the XXVII Corps that for many months held the defense on the Moscow-Minsk highway on the outskirts of Orsha. These positions became the "Western Front All Quiet", the attempts of the Red Army to hack them time after time failed. They were attended by Soviet divisions that had become skilled in positional battles in the Western direction, and a fresh and large Polish infantry division. Next to Völkers was the short and overweight General Golwitzer, the former commander of the LIII Corps, which defended Vitebsk. The troops under his command held positions near Vitebsk for a long time, this city became a small "Verdun" of the Soviet-German front. What led the generals from a succession of successes in defense to a swift defeat and a humiliating march down a Moscow street drenched in the summer sun?
A column of German prisoners of war during the "march of the vanquished" in Moscow on July 17, 1944. 19 generals are marching in front of a compact group
In the context of events in the Western strategic direction, in general, "Bagration" looks like a real miracle. The positional front of Army Group Center, famous for its stubbornness since the time of the battles for Rzhev, was not just hacked with an advance of several tens of kilometers, it collapsed rapidly, the hostilities moved from protracted battles for the "forester's hut" to maneuverable actions and tank breakthroughs tens of kilometers a day.
German generals captured during Operation Bagration before the "march of the vanquished."
Front row from left to right: Vincenz Müller (XII AK), Paul Voelkers (XXVII AK), Friedrich Hollwitzer (LIII AK), Kurt-Jürgen von Lützow (XXXV AK). In the second row, from left to right, Rudolf Bamler (12th infantry division), Walter Heine (6th divisional division), Adolf Haman (commandant of Bobruisk), Edmund Hoffmeister (383rd division), Gustav Gere (707th division, wearing a garrison cap)
Before the start of Operation Bagration, perhaps only desperate optimists could believe in a breakthrough at a rate of 20 km per day. Actually, before the outbreak of hostilities, the troops that arrived looked at the consequences of the winter battles without enthusiasm. Commander of the 11th Guards. army K. N. Galitsky in his memoirs unambiguously spoke about this:
“At the breakthrough area designated by the front commander, we saw the skeletons of dozens of our tanks burned out in previous battles. This picture led to sad reflections and reminded of the failures in this direction in the winter of 1944 " 1
Liberation of Belarus. 1944.M .: Nauka, 1970.S. 434.
The soldiers and officers of the four fronts in Belarus in June 1944, occupying trenches in the front line and places in combat vehicles in caponiers in the near rear, were not at all sure of their victory and success. Despite the fact that it was June 1944, which is associated in the memory of descendants with the victories of the last war summer. They didn't know all this. There remained reasonable doubts as to whether the next offensive would not be a failure or just a partial success with heavy losses. There was even greater concern in the headquarters of formations and associations - their inhabitants had much more information about the past months and the series of failures of their predecessors, and sometimes of their own. Anxiety about the result spurred and forced to work with redoubled and tripled energy. That is why the joy of the achieved success for all these people became special and poignant.
Therefore, the story of Operation Bagration will have to begin with the events of the winter of 1943/44, when the Red Army tried to crush the Center GA in a series of positional battles of varying degrees of failure. The confidence of the German command in the ability to hold positions in Belarus was largely based on this experience of many months of successful defense. Later, already during interrogation in Soviet captivity, the aforementioned former commander of the XXVII Army Corps, General Voelkers, said:
"In the area of the Central Army Group 2
This is how Heersgruppe Mitte, Army Group Center, was translated in Soviet documents of that period.
Local or limited-target attacks were expected. The High Command believed that the Central Army Group would be able to delay this advance of the Red Army, as it had done so far. " 3
TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462, D. 292, L. 55.
Infantry General Paul Völkers knew what he was talking about: for many months, from October 1943, he commanded a corps defending the Minsk-Moscow highway and subjected to powerful attacks by Soviet troops. The fact that the German generals quite calmly looked at the Soviet preparations for the summer offensive was in no small part due to the success of the Wehrmacht in defense in the previous period.
This book is the first part of the work on Operation Bagration and chronologically covers the period from October 1943, when a positional front was formed in the Western direction, and up to the first stage of the Belarusian offensive operation (June 23 - July 4, 1944). In a word, from the formation to the crushing of the "Western Front All Quiet". Accordingly, it is divided into an overview of winter offensive operations, an analysis of the state of forces of the parties before the start of the summer campaign, and a story about the hostilities on June 22 (23) - July 4, 1944, which ended with the liberation of Minsk.
In view of the colossal scale of what was happening, a differentiated approach to the presentation of the material is absolutely necessary. Some episodes are covered in more detail, with a higher level of detail, some with less.
I would also like to say a few words about the sources used in writing this book. The situation with Soviet documents is paradoxical. On the one hand, in contrast to 1941-1942. the preservation of documents from 1944 is simply excellent. On the other hand, the demand for these documents was low.
Back in 1967, in his conversation with K. Simonov, A. M. Vasilevsky lamented: “It's amazing how little we use documents. Twenty years have passed since the end of the war, people remember, argue, but often argue without documents, without verification, which can be easily carried out. Quite recently, while looking for some documents, I found a huge amount of documents in one of the departments of the General Staff. Dispatches, negotiations on the most important operations of the war, which testify with absolute accuracy how things actually happened. But from the war itself to the present day, as these documents were laid, the way they are. Nobody looked into them ”.
I must say that A.M. Vasilevsky himself showed an example of how to do it. His article in the collection "Liberation of Belarus" in 1970 is full of documents taken from the encryption department of the General Staff (links to the fund 48a TsAMO). This made Alexander Mikhailovich's article one of the most informative, if not the most informative, in the entire collection. Unfortunately, she looked like a black sheep in a series of other materials. Undocumented disputes continue to this day. A typical example here is the story of the planning of the 1st Belorussian Front offensive and "two strikes". From work to work, the version from the memoirs of KK Rokossovsky is repeated, although the planning documents for "Bagration" lie on the surface. Less well-known was the story of the actions of the 5th Guards. tank army P.A.Rotmistrov and its use in two versions, also well readable from documents.
However, having the operational documents and knowing the sequence of events with an accuracy of the presentation in these documents, I want more - the motivation of the decisions made and the assessment of the situation. One of the problems here is the emasculation of many Soviet memoirs. The point is not even the usual exaggerations for this genre (although this issue will also be analyzed). The problem is precisely the loss of valuable information about what was happening. So, for example, the memoirs of A. S. Burdeyny in the same collection "Liberation of Belarus" are written as if by an agitator-propagandist, and not by a military general, who really distinguished himself in that operation. However, the dynamics of decision-making, seen in the documents, is simply absent. Information about the operational situation in the article, one might say, is zero. Such texts involuntarily evoke associations with the words of the character of the famous film L. Gaidai about "spaceships plying the Bolshoi Theater."
By 1944, the documents of both sides were kept at a high level, the experience of the war affected not only training, but also the formalization and detail of reporting. However, here the big problem was the massive loss of documents by German formations and formations in the final period of the war. It is all the more surprising that, contrary to expectations, the documents of the army level are well preserved: the logs of military operations, supplements to them of the 3rd tank, 9th, 4th and 2nd armies, which were part of the GA "Center". This makes it possible to reconstruct the picture of events and decisions taken at the army headquarters level.
At the same time, the defeat of the troops of the GA "Center" in Belarus inevitably led to a massive loss of operational documents, primarily divisional and corps level. You can even say more: the surviving and accessible documentation on a number of Wehrmacht formations ends just in the spring of 1944. In some cases, the surviving documents break off in June 1944. Thus, the surviving Journal of Combat Actions (ZhBD) of the LIII Army Corps, operating near Vitebsk, contains last entry dated June 17th. Other buildings have been partially preserved. So, according to XXXIX tank and VI army corps, ZhBD for June 1944 were preserved, but absent for later periods.
Of course, something became Soviet trophies. So, an almost complete set in the form of a journal of military operations of the 3rd Panzer Army and its supplements is present in the so-called 500th fund of TsAMO, that is, the fund of trophy documents, after the war it was transferred. And what is curious, the Soviet troops got one of the copies of the magazine, another copy was preserved at the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army and already became a trophy of the allies, was subsequently microfilmed in the United States.
At the same time, the loss of some, traditional, sources about the activities of the German troops during the "Bagration" period coexisted with the appearance of others, less widespread. Here the grandeur of the catastrophe in Belarus worked for historians. In the course of work to disband and reorganize the formations of Army Group Center in late summer and autumn 1944, officers and even soldiers and junior commanders who had left the encirclement were questioned about the events of late June and early July. Actually, it was common after major defeats. The same kind of reports were written by the commanders of the Red Army who came out of the Bialystok-Minsk and Kiev "cauldrons".
It would be more accurate to say that the surviving participants in the events in Belarus described in a narrative form the sequence of events that led the GA "Center" to complete collapse. Some of the advantages of such stories over dry Kriegstagebuchs 4
KTB - Combat Journal.
It is a living narrative, in which the narrators most often did not skimp on personal emotional assessments of what was happening. At the same time, the requirements for the reports were formalized, which did not allow the writers to get off with general words. These requirements looked like this:
“Everyone involved in processing the affairs of the division must, by 11.9.44, submit a short report on the participation of the division in battles from 20.6.44. Among other things, it should contain:
1) Divisional sector and main line of defense at 20.6.44.
2) command post of division headquarters, 1b and, if possible, regiments at 20.6.44.
3) The general state of the division (fully operational, replenished or assembled from several units, etc.).
4) The beginning of the enemy's attacks - in which direction, new frontiers, the result.
5) Retreat - when and in what direction, new frontiers, results.
6) Data (briefly) about the experience gained by the division during the withdrawal, for example, enemy lines of defense, partisans, the fate of individual units, combat groups, regiments, etc., the fate of commanders and headquarters " 5
NARA T78 R139 frame 6068504.
This formalization certainly benefited the written documents. As you can see from the list of requirements, they were oriented towards the accumulation of experience. It is possible that it was their understanding that led to the emergence of the "wandering cauldron" tactics characteristic of the period of the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945. One way or another, the reports make it possible to some extent compensate for the loss of operational documents of the formations in the eyes of the historian.
An equally curious source is the interrogation of captured German generals. "Bagration" was unusually "fruitful" for high-ranking prisoners of war. Of course, mostly German generals were interviewed for purely utilitarian purposes about the state of the Wehrmacht as a whole. However, the interrogations also contain descriptions of events at the front and their personal assessments by the generals. Part of this information was used in Soviet writings on Bagration, for example, the interrogation of General Trout, commander of the 78th Infantry Division, is often quoted.
In general, it can be stated that a set of documents available to an ordinary researcher (that is, without any special rights) for describing Operation Bagration at the modern level is present in the archives. Only their cyclopean volume can stop here due to the grandeur of the operation itself.
Section one
"Quiet on the Western Front ..."
The version of the history of the Great Patriotic War, familiar from textbooks and films, can lead to the conclusion that there are striking differences between the First and Second World Wars. Perhaps the formation of a stable opinion and even confidence that the positional battles of Paschendale, Somme, Gallipoli and Verdun safely remained the property of the war of 1914-1918. However, it is not. World War II just turned out to be more diverse. It combined both maneuverable operations, in which tanks covered 30-50 km, or even 100 km per day, and positional battles that lasted for many months, the advance in which was sometimes calculated in units of kilometers, or even hundreds of meters. ...
One of the paradoxes of the history of the war is that the most impressive success of the Soviet armed forces - the defeat of GA Center during Operation Bagration - was achieved after a series of failures in the western strategic direction from October 1943 to April 1944. while in Ukraine the Red Army was successfully advancing and liberating a huge territory, the Western Front was practically marking time. The successes of the neighboring 1st Baltic and Belorussian fronts were rather limited. The result was a trial by a special committee of the State Defense Committee with organizational conclusions and organizational changes, including the removal of a number of front command personnel and the division of the Western Front.
For a long time, the western direction remained problematic for the Red Army. 1942 was marked by bloody positional battles in the Moscow direction. Of course, the positional battles themselves were, in terms of absolute numbers of losses (especially irrecoverable ones), better than retreats and encirclements in the southern sector of the front. However, after the success of offensive operations in the south, starting with Uranus, this already dubious advantage began to lose its significance.
The traditional excuse for the "unfinished" (or, to call a spade a spade - failed) operations of the Red Army in the western strategic direction has become the thesis of "shackling" the enemy. So, in the 12-volume Brezhnev volume, it was stated: “Through active operations throughout the winter and the first spring months, the 1st Baltic, Western and 1st Belorussian fronts pinned down the main forces of command at the expense of its forces to provide assistance to army groups "South", "A" and "North", which suffered at that time the hardest defeats " 6
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 Volume 8. The collapse of the defensive strategy of the fascist bloc. M .: Voenizdat, 1977.S. 137.
In the same way, the failures of the offensives near Rzhev in 1942 were justified (and to this day are justified). I must say that this excuse appeared in hot pursuit of events. Even then, in the spring of 1944, the head of the operational department of the 33rd Army, Colonel I.A.Tolkonyuk, in his letter to I.V. Stalin 7
See Appendix for full details.
Wrote the following:
“Among some of the leading officials of our army there is an opinion [...] that we have fully achieved the goal that was set before us, pinning down the enemy in front of our front, preventing the transfer of his forces to the south, where large-scale operations are being conducted. This opinion seems to me to be wrong, and I disagree with it.
A simple calculation shows that with the forces and resources expended during the described period on the Western Front, it was possible to carry out one or two serious and well-prepared operations, break through the enemy's defense front at least 20-30 km of the front, build on success and not only pin down the enemy , but to liberate a large territory, or to attract a significant part of the enemy's forces from other directions, or, due to large defeats, force him to an operational withdrawal " 8
TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8712 D. 736. L. 107.
Indeed, the success of "Bagration" in the summer of 1944 confirmed the words of Tolkonyuk - after the collapse of the GA "Center" front, the Germans were forced to hastily transfer divisions from Army Group "Northern Ukraine" to Belarus and the Baltic states. Thus, the prerequisites were created for the successful implementation of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation and access to the Vistula. To this we can add that Army Group Center in the winter of 1943/44 held its positions almost exclusively with infantry, the most valuable mobile formations of the German army were concentrated in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Suffice it to say that not a single Panther tank was opposed to the Soviet Western Front in winter positional battles, they operated to the south or north (in GA Sever). For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that in modern domestic historiography, primarily at the suggestion of M.A.
In 1943, the situation seemed to get off the ground. Already at the beginning of the year, the hated Rzhevsky ledge was evacuated. The failure of the "Citadel" and the success of the Soviet counteroffensive made it possible to bring down the GA "Center" from its familiar positions. In the course of the successful Smolensk operation, the troops of the Western Front achieved the cherished goal of the Soviet offensives in 1942 - the city of Smolensk.
However, it was during this period that positional defense was elevated to the dominant principle of warfare: Hitler announced the construction of the so-called Eastern Wall. On August 12, 1943, the Wehrmacht High Command's Combat Journal noted: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces transfers to the commands of the four army groups on the Eastern Front the Fuhrer's order No. 10 on the immediate construction of the Eastern Wall." It was supposed to become a defensive line on which it was supposed to wear down the Red Army in positional defensive battles, inflict losses and force the signing of a peace. According to the plan, the Eastern Wall was to consist of the so-called Wotan Line in the zone of Army Groups A and South and the Panther Line in the zone of Army Groups Center and North. Thus, the Eastern Rampart formed a continuous barrier from the Sea of Azov to the Baltic Sea, passing along the Kerch Peninsula, the Molochnaya River, Dnieper Plains, the middle course of the Dnieper, the Sozh River to Gomel, further east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and along the Narva River.
It was to this Panther-Stellung line, which had been under construction for several weeks, that the troops of Army Group Center retreated in the fall of 1943 after the defeat at Smolensk.
Historian Aleksey Isaev in the program "The Price of Victory" on the Echo of Moscow talks about the Belarusian offensive operation in the summer of 1944 "Bagration".
D. ZAKHAROV: Good evening, the program "The Price of Victory" is on the air, and I am its host Dmitry Zakharov. Today my guest is Alexey Isaev.
A. ISAEV: Good evening.
D. ZAKHAROV: Historian, great specialist in the history of the war. Vitaly Dymarsky is absent today. As is customary, I remind you the phone number for SMS is +7 985 970-45-45. So, let's get down to our today's topic "Operation Bagration". We received a fairly large number of perfectly sane questions. I suppose, Alexey, have you seen them already?
A. ISAEV: Yes.
D. ZAKHAROV: But before we start answering the questions, we probably need to make a small preamble and tell not about how the battle began, but how the preparation and development of the operation proceeded, and the accompanying events that made it possible to carry it out successfully.
A. ISAEV: Well, of course, both sides were preparing for the summer campaign, and the German command, led by Hitler, considered that their opponents would strike a powerful blow from Ukraine, from the territory that was liberated in the winter of 1943-1944 and cut off 2 groups at once armies. It cannot be said that such grandiose plans were never hatched by the Soviet command before. So, there was such a plan, "Polar Star", when they were going to cut off the entire Army Group "North". Likewise, during Operation Big Saturn, they could cut off 2 army groups at once with a strike on Rostov after Stalingrad. However, in the real summer of 1944, the Soviet command had completely different plans.
I must say that at first the situation developed, as they say, wherever you go, everywhere a wedge. In Ukraine, indeed, great successes were achieved, but large mechanized formations of the enemy also gathered here. Lots of tanks. By that time, there were not many new T-34-85s. And the prospects for the development of these successful strikes - they were, in fact, vague, and such a person as Shtymenko, one of the major Soviet staff officers, frankly writes about this. In Belarus, too, the situation was not sugar.
D. ZAKHAROV: Belarusian balcony.
A. ISAEV: Yes, there was a Belarusian balcony, which could not be touched. During the entire winter campaign, he was hammered from all sides, but the results were, frankly, disappointing. Moreover, in the spring of 1944, a commission of the State Defense Committee passed, as a result of which heads flew. That is, people were removed from the command, in particular, Sokolovsky was removed from the command of the Western Front, and it seemed not a good idea to continue pounding his forehead into this Belorussian balcony. But nevertheless, it was decided to do just that, to try to destroy this gigantic Balcony, which hung both over Ukraine and prevented it from breaking through to the Baltic states.
And we can say how the reinforcement of those troops that were supposed to attack it, sent, first, new commanders instead of those removed following the results of the winter campaign. They sent Chernikhovsky, the man who became the front commander at 38 years old. This is a man who distinguished himself when crossing the Dnieper, and he was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In general, the fronts were cut more finely so that the commanders could sit closer to the troops and see what was happening.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, more flexible.
A. ISAEV: More flexible management. They sent the conqueror of the Crimea Zakharov, a man of quite complex nature, who, first of all, arrived at the 2nd Belorussian Front, began to teach them how to live, how to attack by Crimean standards. But they quickly explained to him that in the forests of Belarus, these techniques of his that he offers are completely useless. And, in general, Shtymenko, whom I mentioned, who was also sent by an observer from the headquarters, was a kind of counterbalance to the rather energetic, one might say, authoritarian Zakharov. And he constantly pulled him back. And in fact, they had such a relationship, to put it mildly, complicated. As, however, with the commanders of armies and even divisions.
Therefore, the planning went very carefully, because the main thing was not to frighten the enemy away. It was clear that yes, most of the mechanized formations in Ukraine, but if the Germans sniff out something, that's all. These forests, a small number of roads - they could play a fatal role.
D. ZAKHAROV: Swampy area.
A. ISAEV: Yes, swampy terrain - all this could lead to a repetition of the winter campaign, when we wedge shallowly, the offensive stops, losses, but no result. The risk was great. And enough camouflage measures were deployed.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. The famous campaign to create a pseudo shock wedge north of Chisinau.
A. ISAEV: Yes, north of Chisinau, and, in fact, it was not even necessary to imitate, because most of the tank armies remained in Ukraine, but, nevertheless, firstly, there was a tough radio silence and some of the Germans said that the Russians, contrary to their custom, observed complete radio silence. One of them even put it this way: "I felt that something was wrong precisely because of the complete silence on the air." All marches took place at night. For this, the tailgate of the car and the hood were painted white, and it was strictly forbidden to make any overtaking. And so, in single file, one can say how the blind, again, by the bright white painted signs of the car, moved at night. If morning came, it was necessary to stop and hide in the forest.
PO-2 and Kukuruzniki planes constantly flew around the areas where the troops were concentrated. And those who violated the camouflage, they immediately dropped the pennant. It was, one might say, humiliating. That is, to any commander: "Here, and we see you." Naturally, they tried to avoid it with all their might. And in the daytime - movement only in the opposite direction. And there were about 100 cars to the front, which were allowed to travel around the clock. But this, again, was strictly regulated.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. But back to planning. Here was the decision to strike in 6 places, if my memory serves me. Here, one of our listeners asks: “Why was such a decision made? Here, not in one place to hit or from the flanks to try to bypass in 2 places, namely to carry out some deconcentration. Was there a certain risk in this? "
A. ISAEV: Well, generally speaking, the terrain was difficult and it was dangerous to move large masses of troops. In addition, the concentration of tank armies in one place would have been noticed anyway. Therefore, they distributed the blows along the front, and wanted to bring down the German front gradually. Moreover, there is a known story - and one of our listeners asked a question about it - about how Rokossovsky asked his front to deliver 2 blows. Zhukov insisted that there was one blow, and Rokossovsky said: "Let us hit Bobruisk from two sides."
And I must say that shortly before the operation Zhukov, who went to the area where the main blow from the east to Bobruisk was supposed to be, he said: “Nothing, nothing, you will break through to Bobruisk, we will lend you a hand. We will pull you out of those swamps where you are going to attack. " And Rokossovsky remained just south of Bobruisk. He was confident that where he hit, the Germans are weaker, even if the terrain is worse, and they will achieve more success. He managed to demand it, and in a conversation with Stalin personally. When they said to him: “Are you sure that you should strike 2 blows? Go out to another room, think, come back. " And so he returned 3 times like this - this is one of such famous stories about how they persuaded him to act as Zhukov advises. But nevertheless, he defended his decision and Stalin said: "Yes, let him act like this." And it helped in the future, in fact.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, I probably need to say a few words about the preparation of support. About 390 thousand tons of ammunition were brought there. Only ammunition.
A. ISAEV: Yes. And by the way, the operation was postponed relative to the time when it was supposed to start according to plans. Stalin, when the Allies landed, he wrote to Churchill ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Alexey, excuse me, here's another question from the listener: “Was the start of Operation Bagration agreed with the allies? Or did everything happen? .. "
A. ISAEV: It was agreed to start a major operation of some kind. In Tehran, it was decided, indeed, under pressure from the USSR and the Americans, that we were landing in Normandy, and at the same time it was promised that an offensive would begin in the east. And, indeed, on the first day of the landing in Normandy, Stalin wrote to Churchill that an offensive would begin in mid-June in the near future. But in mid-June it did not start, precisely because the ammunition was being brought up. Moreover, the southern fronts, exactly where Rokossovsky was, they eventually began the operation a day later. And in fact, the operation began on June 22, but no one deliberately thought about the 3rd anniversary of the war - it really happened that way. Moreover, the beginning of the operation on June 23 remains in history.
D. ZAKHAROV: Before we start fighting, I probably need to say a few more words about the specifics of the area. Swampy, wooded. That is, these are the events that were held in this context. Because the sapper work there was, of course, probably the most large-scale in the entire war.
A. ISAEV: Yes, first of all, indeed, it is wooded and swampy. When it was necessary to lay the gates and tests were carried out, how the tanks would drive along these gates. And also the front, after all, it stood there for a long time and the Germans managed to bury themselves well and make developed minefields. And the decision was made on continuous mine clearance. I read the report of the GABTU, the armored vehicle directorate, there was such a phrase - you can say that now it seems funny, then it was, perhaps, sad - that the greatest danger to tanks at the beginning of the offensive is represented by mines, in brackets "especially their own" ... And "especially their own" - they were cleared of mines by a solid. Moreover, in order not to frighten off the enemy, they simply twisted the fuses out of them.
Unfortunately, the Soviet memories of "Bagration" - they are written like a blueprint, that, here, we had continuous swamps, but we figured out how to break through these swamps. In fact, everything was not so bad, and this engineering training, some kind of wet shoes - it played, rather, a supporting role. First of all, it was precisely the identification of the enemy's defense system, the accumulation of sufficient forces in order to deliver a blow that would not be repelled. And most importantly: the Germans have assembled a tank fist in the Ukraine. They had 7 tank divisions in Army Group Northern Ukraine. In Belarus in all groups of the army "Center" 1 tank division. And, in fact, they had no reserves to seal the breakthroughs. What they had time to do before, again, in the winter of 1943-1944, before that near Rzhev - this is all at the expense of tank divisions, which: Soviet troops broke through somewhere, Panzerwaffe immediately rushes there and stands up as a wall. And, as a rule, it was difficult to break through this wall.
And in Belarus, Army Group Center was essentially a colossus with feet of clay. But this colossus had to be hit hard enough for it to fall off its feet of clay. And the point was precisely in this strong blow.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. The Germans were commanded there by a man with the iconic surname Bush.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Naturally, he is not a relative of American presidents.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. But, as it were, just as successful.
A. ISAEV: Well, in fact, he defended quite successfully in Army Group North. And when Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center for several years, got into a car accident, they took Bush from Army Group North precisely so that he would normally defend secondary directions. The genius of defense Model was in Army Group Northern Ukraine, where it was believed that it was there that they would strike and go to cut off to the Baltic Sea, and immediately 2 army groups would disappear, if not to stand up as a wall. This wall was built there, and "not the genius of defense" Bush got the Army Group "Center". Moreover, he was so sure, again, himself, that they would not hit where he was in command, that 2 days before the start of the Soviet offensive, he went on vacation.
D. ZAKHAROV: What Hitler later recalled to him.
A. ISAEV: Yes, of course, he was later remembered, but, nevertheless, many ... This, now, more precisely, after the war, the German commanders are actively blaming Hitler, but they were really sure, and some intelligence reports on preparations in Belarus are an auxiliary operation in order to distract from this powerful global strike at Kovel.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, let's move on to some statistics - this is what the Red Army had at the time of the start of the operation, and, accordingly, the adversaries.
A. ISAEV: Yes. There was a question from one of the listeners regarding the balance of forces in the air and how the actions of the allies actually influenced. You need to immediately answer directly: yes, they did. The Reich Air Force, which provided German air defense, at that time consisted of almost 1,400 aircraft. The 3rd Air Fleet in the West - more than 500. Accordingly, the 6th Air Fleet in Belarus has 600 aircraft.
D. ZAKHAROV: All types.
A. ISAEV: Yes, of all types. This is an important clarification, since it included 300 2-engine bombers, even 4-engine Henkel-177 with twin engines. And they had to hit Soviet strategic targets from this forward-facing Balcony.
By 1944, the Germans, as it were, one might say, woke up and thought that it would be nice to wage some kind of strategic war. Drawn near Velikie Luki by some kind of Soviet communications. But, in a word, they assembled 300 2-engine bombers, which were to repel the offensive neither mind nor heart. And there were fighters in the 6th Air Fleet as of May 31, the last reporting date - 60. I emphasize: not 660, but by June 22 as a result of strikes on airfields, any air battles, 40 of them remained before the operation. fronts and even long-range bomber aviation to them - 5675 Soviet aircraft, including 1800 attack aircraft, 400 PO-2 light and 2500 fighters.
D. ZAKHAROV: In general, there was nothing to catch.
A. ISAEV: Yes, indeed, there was nothing to catch. Because, again, exactly the same as with tanks, when Army Group Center had 10% of German tanks on the eastern front and not a single Panther. In general, the tank is produced for a year - there was not a single tank of this type in Belarus at all, neither combat-ready, not at all.
And it's the same with aviation. When most of the attack aircraft, which could attack the advancing Soviet tank columns, when fighters. In Belarus there are 2 groups of fighters, in Ukraine - 7. The difference is very significant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, is the group a regiment?
A. ISAEV: Yes.
D. ZAKHAROV: An analogue of our regiment.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Well, if you look at the last reporting date, then 60 versus 140. In general, the difference by German standards is quite significant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Against 140 in Ukraine, I mean.
A. ISAEV: Yes, 140 in Ukraine in the 4th Air Fleet. And in the 6th - respectively, 60. Naturally, then some kind of transfers began, but, nevertheless, on the first day ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, that's just ridiculous.
A. ISAEV: 5600 Soviet aircraft. This is, indeed, a very serious advantage, and it, in fact, allowed to shatter this balcony, which is quite durable. And from experience they decided that let the attack aircraft not hit the front line, let them hit the artillery.
D. ZAKHAROV: Which was wise.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Because the artillery that hits from a closed position is invisible. That is, a person on the front line going on the attack may not even see the enemy and die. But these positions of artillery, which from the air, one might say, from a bird's eye view, are a sitting duck. That is, there are guns, gunners are scurrying around them, ammunition piles are nearby.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. And considering that it is in the 2nd echelon.
A. ISAEV: Yes, it is deep, it is all open. Well, actually, from the air, this can be said to be a very soft target. And this soft target was attacked in the first place. And with complete impunity, well, practically with impunity, precisely because the opposition was insignificant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Tanks?
A. ISAEV: Tanks. The Germans, as I said, had 11% of all the tanks on the eastern front - that's about 530 tanks and self-propelled guns. There were actually fewer tanks. Most of the armored vehicles were distributed among the infantry divisions.
D. ZAKHAROV: Do we have tanks?
A. ISAEV: We had 4,000 tanks. Tanks and self-propelled guns, of course, included the SU-76 with bulletproof armor. They were gaining, of course, numbers, but, nevertheless, putting them one on one with the Sturmgeschutz self-propelled guns, which has 80 mm armor and, in general, a tough nut to crack for most Soviet armored vehicles, is not worth it. But nevertheless, the ratio was exactly that - 1 to 8.
And the main thing to evaluate is the number of mobile connections. The Germans had 1 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. That is, there were not enough reserves that could jump up from their seats, run to plug the breakthrough. We were discharged from near Odessa Pliev's group, horse-mechanized, when the mechanized corps and the cavalry corps. And this group was sent just to the place that Rokossovsky had chosen for himself. That is, dense forests, swamps, but, nevertheless, this mass of trucks and cavalry - it could break through them. They used this discharged Pliev, Rotmistrov's tank army - it was also from the southerners, that is, those who were advancing in the southwestern direction. We already talked about her when we talked about Korsun-Shevchenkovsky - that she was sent to Belarus. And a sufficient advantage was achieved precisely due to the fact that they concentrated their efforts against Belarus, against the Army Group Center.
D. ZAKHAROV: Human power - 2.6 million, if my memory serves me right. A. ISAEV: Well, just the same, 2.6 - this is calculated not quite accurately. If you take such a book "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War", then there the forces for "Bagration" are estimated at 1 million 200 thousand.
D. ZAKHAROV: How is this discrepancy in statistics?
A. ISAEV: First, at the expense of the rear units, which were located quite deep in the rear. Secondly, due to the fact that the 1st Belorussian Front of Rokossovsky, which at first did not participate - it was over a million - it was calculated entirely in Bagration, although half of it actually participated in the operation, even less than half - there are about 430 thousand. Therefore, 2.5 thousand came running, and they were opposed.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, 2 and a half.
A. ISAEV: Yes. And it so happened that with this count of all the troops ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, everyone counted.
A. ISAEV: They counted everything, really. This may be the correct approach, but, nevertheless, it does not give a real picture. Because if you look at the forces that went directly to the offensive in June-July 1944, they are in a fairly significant source of the "Operation of the Soviet Armed Forces" - it was stamped "Secret" in the late 50s. This is 1 million 200 thousand. Accordingly, Army Group Center had 900,000 men, including about 400,000 in the rear. Therefore, the balance of power - it was, nevertheless, not as devastating as it seems, if you count 2.5 million.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, if we consider purely German combatants.
A. ISAEV: Yes, if we consider the combatants, the ratio is slightly more than 2 to 1.
D. ZAKHAROV: We will continue ... Or rather, we will launch a victorious offensive after the news is released. I thank Alexey for coming and telling me so interestingly. And with you, dear listeners and viewers, we will meet immediately after the break for the news block.
D. ZAKHAROV: Good evening again, dear listeners of the Echo of Moscow radio station and viewers of the RTVi channel. The program "The Price of Victory" is on the air, and I, its host Dmitry Zakharov. Vitaly Dymarsky is not here today, and my guest is the historian Alexei Isaev, with whom we are discussing Operation Bagration.
Before we continue the discussion, I will remind you of our phone number for SMS-letters: +7 985 970-45-45. So, Alexey, finally, let's get started. Prepared, concentrated, brought in ammunition, courage and food, now you can attack.
A. ISAEV: Yes. It all started on the right flank of the advancing troops. Accordingly, on the left flank of the Germans. There they had such a fortress Vitebsk. In general, Hitler by that time came to the idea of such fortresses, which are placed in communication centers. They had to be held back at all costs. The idea, in fact, is not the stupidest one, but, nevertheless, at that time the German military leaders, one might say, sabotaged it. So, this Vitebsk, which held out in the previous winter, was defeated in just a few days. We shifted the direction of the blows, hit a little further. That is, not in those, one might say, dents that were achieved in winter, but slightly to the side. And literally in 2 days we managed to create a threat of encirclement. Naturally, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army Reinhardt said: "Let's take it all away," he was told: "No." That is, Bush played the role of a simple translator of Hitler's orders. Although he tried to politely address upstairs: "Maybe we will take it all the same?" But, nevertheless, when he was told "No", he said: "Well, okay," and broadcast it down. And, accordingly, Vitebsk was surrounded very quickly. We tried to break out of it, and Hitler said that “no, let’s you sit in this fortress. And send an officer of the General Staff there. " That is, this is not from the German General Staff, but simply such a title that a person has an academic education. To which Reinhardt enthusiastically said: “Such a wonderful order, my Fuhrer, I must deliver personally. I myself will jump with a parachute to Vitebsk. " Naturally, Hitler was taken aback and the question of someone jumping with a parachute to Vitebsk, delivering this, of course, an important order, it was closed. But, nevertheless, on the radio the garrison was told: "The division must remain in this fortress and state the name of the commander." The commander's name was Hitter. General Hitter, however, held out for literally 12 hours compared to the bulk of the defenders of Vitebsk, the corps of such General Gollwitzer. And also literally in the morning Gollwitzer went to break through, and in the evening Hitter thought that there was a prospect, “Well, this Vitebsk,” and he also rushed into the forests south-west of the city. There, in fact, the Germans were surrounded, intensively rolled away with these attack aircraft, which could act with practically impunity, and the Germans surrendered rather quickly. Both Gollwitzer and Hitter were captured. Subsequently, they were among those who walked through Moscow. That, if time remains, I think that the March of the Vanquished, too, can be told.
One way or another, the Vitebsk fortress fell. And a 150-kilometer gap formed in the German front. It was a breach on their left flank. In the meantime, things were going well for Rokossovsky. Despite the fact that Zhukov said “Yes, we will lend you a hand, but we will pull you out of the swamps,” nevertheless, the offensive, which, in fact, Zhukov watched and which was carried out by Gorbatov's army, did not develop very quickly.
Despite a powerful strike by bombers at night, Soviet long-range aviation. And what is interesting, they put trucks on the bridgehead and turned on the headlights on them so that they shine in the rear. The Germans did not see them from the front, but from above it was perfectly visible, this line, a chain of lights, so they bombed well. But, nevertheless, the offensive was developing not shaky, not roll. Moreover, this only German tank division moved in there. And it could well have been a repetition near Bobruisk, that is, on the right flank of the Germans, what was already in winter. But this is Rokossovsky's idea that we will break through the swamps, it worked. There, the defense was weaker and the mechanized cavalry group of Pliev was quickly introduced into the breakthrough, the tank corps and Rokossovsky held out his hand. He quickly broke through to Bobruisk, and this is the only German tank division, when a serious crisis arose south of the city, it was turned 180 degrees and it rushed to extinguish the fire there. While she was running from south to north, from north to south, the front was broken through and another cauldron was formed, this time near Bobruisk. There, the 9th Army got into this cauldron, the same army that defended Rzhev, which was advancing near Kursk. And she, finally, after, in general, many months, when they tried to break her, she was broken. Indeed, in just a few days, its defenses collapsed.
At this moment - it was June 28 - Bush was removed and put in his place as the genius of defense, Model. I must say that Model did not save his army, which he commanded, the 9th. In fact, he left her to fend for herself, he understood that it was necessary to restore the front. And there weren't any deblocking strikes, in fact.
D. ZAKHAROV: A small remark is probably needed here, because these two breakthroughs with a total front length of 450 kilometers - they were just a verdict, in fact.
A. ISAEV: Yes. There, even the common front was about 700 kilometers, and there were 2 breaches on the right and left flanks. It turned out to be classic Cannes. The Germans had a mass of infantry. And here is this infantry, which is the 4th German army, which with a part stood on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. In June 1944, the Germans still held a foothold on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, that is, one might say, it was a psychological thing, of course, but, nevertheless. And this mass of infantry had to get up and run with all its might to Minsk. Because both flanks have been broken through, and Soviet mechanized units are marching towards Minsk from the north and south. They had to compete in running speed with Soviet tanks.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. This is not an easy task.
A. ISAEV: Yes, the task is not easy, besides, the Soviet infantry was pressing from the front. And this mass - it rushed first to the Berezina River. At first they thought to keep the front there.
D. ZAKHAROV: Berezina is generally a cursed place.
A. ISAEV: Yes, Berezina is a cursed place for the invaders. In 1812, Napoleon tried to retreat there very unsuccessfully, and the same thing happened with the 4th Army, which was marching towards Minsk and on the way to Berezina they had one crossing, which was constantly bombed. These columns of infantry were constantly ironed by attack aircraft. Then the Germans said that they were attacked with small anti-tank bombs. The Germans had almost no tanks, and instead of tanks, the infantry became the target of these small bombs. And when they poured thousands of these bombs, they mowed the German infantry like sheaves of straw. Because there are many small fragments, quite strong explosions, and they covered a large area. This crossing over the Berezina - there were constant scandals. The military police simply disappeared and, in fact, who was more energetic, who was more strong-willed, he broke through to this crossing. It was constantly bombed, the bridge was held, one might say, on a living thread, they tried to establish some other crossings there. But, nevertheless, it was a march of the doomed, since the tanks were going to Minsk and they were trying to stop them, of course. The model with him from Army Group "Northern Ukraine" took tanks. He threw the 5th tank division against the Soviet tank columns marching on Minsk.
D. ZAKHAROV: Who went to Minsk?
A. ISAEV: First, this is Rotmistrov. Secondly, these are several tank corps from the Rokossovsky army, and from the Zakharov front. That is, there were several contenders for Minsk. And this 5th Panzer Division - why am I staying on it - because it was one of two divisions that was fully equipped. It had 159 tanks, half of which were Panthers. She was given a full-blooded "Tigers" battalion, that is, 45 "Tigers". More than 200 tanks, more than half - "Tigers" and "Panthers". And Rotmistrov did not have a single T-34-85 in July 1944.
D. ZAKHAROV: But they just started.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Whoever listened to previous programs about the fate of the T-34, he knows what it is about. Well, I think a lot of people know. I specifically checked the documents: Rotmistrov's army received the first T-34-85 at the end of July - at the beginning of August. And, behold, 2 tank corps of Rotmistrov's army crashed at full speed into this 5th tank division with "Tigers" and "Panthers", and the battle turned out, naturally, not in favor of Rotmistrov. They even sent a special investigation - by the way, Shtymenko writes about this, as they say, in the remote Soviet years he wrote about it there. Everyone who wrote about Bagration is considering this episode.
Indeed, the Germans managed to restrain Rotmistrov. And he was unlucky, frankly. Because to run into, even with several hundred tanks for 200 tanks, half of them - "Panthers" and "Tigers" - it was not fun. But since he was not the only contender for Minsk, this one German division, of course, could not build a solid front. And the neighboring corps advancing along the next route, again, from the southerners, from those who fought near Kursk, who attacked in Ukraine - this is Burdeyny's 2nd Tatsinsky Guards Corps - it entered Minsk. From the south, respectively, entered the 1st Guards Tank Corps from the Rokossovsky front. This happened on the 3rd of July. And this mass of German infantry, which was hurrying first to the Berezina, and then to Minsk, was surrounded. Naturally, they lost this race for Minsk on foot. And this large mass is all - it gathered to the east of Minsk, it was gradually squeezed, again ironed by attack aircraft, and even from this cauldron such telegrams were heard that "we will disband such and such a division, such and such a corps." And their resistance was quickly eliminated. That is, they were surrounded on July 3, and the resistance ended by July 11.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, in general, of course, the pace of the operation, if compared with all the previous ones, is absolutely fantastic. 10 days - and the development of such success. In my opinion, this had never happened before Bagration.
A. ISAEV: Yes, before "Bagration" from a static front to a complete defeat - it really happened very quickly. And, in principle, the rate did not even expect such a quick collapse of this Belarusian balcony. A colossus with feet of clay, struck hard enough, fell.
D. ZAKHAROV: I wonder how they digested all this in Berlin?
A. ISAEV: Naturally, in Berlin it was digested without enthusiasm. And Model, in principle, he gave all these infantry masses to the slaughter and tried to build a new front. In fact, if you look ahead, then they managed to stop the advance of Soviet troops only on the Vistula. That is, from Minsk to the Vistula, these were restraining actions, when tank divisions with the same "Tigers", with "Panthers" - they tried to hold back, but they, in general, did not succeed very much and the operation developed. That is, they moved further to the walls of East Prussia, to the Baltic states.
It must be said here that the Panther line, on which they stopped in the spring of 1944, was bypassed. This is the barrier that the Germans built in the Baltics, thanks to Bagration, it was bypassed. And as a result of this, one might say casually. Estonia was liberated. When the Panther was simply hit bypassing this line, again, in a few days, the Estonian corps of Pern was sent, he covered 100 kilometers in a day, went to Tallinn. And they managed to quickly recapture the Baltic states, to lock up a certain number of Germans on the Courland Peninsula. But, nevertheless, the result exceeded all expectations.
A. ISAEV: August 29, yes. Because, in principle, this is even the development of "Bagration", because, again, it is connected with this ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, this is a bonus.
A. ISAEV: Yes, a bonus. This is connected with one of the controversies of the Soviet strategy, when both Zhukov and Vasilevsky said: “But let's strike at East Prussia? And we will capture it. "
D. ZAKHAROV: Right off the bat?
A. ISAEV: Yes. “And now we will seize her with a cavalry charge. Both the Baltics and East Prussia ”. The Baltic states - there they went to the Baltic Sea on July 30, there even the mechanized corps commanders specially said: "Get some water, sign that you took it from the Baltic Sea and came." At the meeting of the rate, there was a bottle on the table that it was from the Baltic Sea. It was such an episode, in general, confirmed. And so the idea was: "Yes, let's break through to East Prussia." She really had almost nothing to defend. But Stalin considered it better, nevertheless, to concentrate his efforts in Poland. Therefore, the reserves, yes, were given, again, to the Ukraine, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation began. The question was asked: "Where was the Ukrainian Galicia division defeated?" Here she was defeated under the fords during the Lvov-Sandomierz. This is not "Bagration", this is what followed him.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, today we will not touch Lvovsko-Sandomirskaya.
A. ISAEV: Yes, we will not touch it, but the fact is that, again, it goes through both Zhukov's memoirs and Vasilevsky's memoirs that their proposal to take East Prussia with a cavalry charge was rejected precisely in favor of to advance to Poland.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, it was probably correct. Because, in general, Prussia turned out to be quite bloody.
A. ISAEV: Well, Prussia turned out to be bloody. Again, as it were, both Zhukov and Vasilevsky say that "but then it was soft." That is, then it was possible to take lukewarm. But this is from the series: "Here, if". Because if you look at the facts, then Vasilevsky was given 2 conquerors of the Crimea, 2 armies that took the Crimea and took Sevastopol. And with their help, in fact, he broke through to the Baltics.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Well, as they say, practice is the criterion of truth. And since this event did not take place, fortunately, I think so.
A. ISAEV: Yes, it’s hard to say how it would have turned out. Because it was then, decades after the war, they said: "And we would have taken it." And what would actually happen? .. Although, indeed, the first clash in East Prussia, when the first Volkssturm, who was thrown into battle, he was simply captured. That is, having seen Soviet tanks, having seen the firepower of the Red Army, people simply surrendered, thought it good to surrender. So, perhaps, it could have been better, but in general, as in the famous anecdote: “And if they were included, the deceased would have taken more bribes. And it turned out so well. " In principle, yes, "Bagration" was and remains the largest defeat of the German army in its entire history.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, probably one of the most elegant and successful operations.
A. ISAEV: Yes, this is indeed a successful operation. It is difficult to call it graceful, because these are many small crushing blows - they so, slightly blur the eyes. And here we, I think, should stop at the losses. The figures of 300 thousand Germans of losses in "Bagration" are often cited. However - so I told on other previous programs about ten days, German reports on losses - and a very interesting picture can be seen from them. If you look at the data on September 30, that is, a month has passed since the "Bagration", then the losses of 4 German armies, which were hit by the "Bagration" - over 300 thousand. And if you count the same armies before December 31, when the front, in general, stood. There were some actions in the Baltics, but they were not so large-scale as to gain losses.
A. ISAEV: Yes, on December 31, 1944, the losses of 4 armies jump right up to 540 thousand. That is, in principle, a large amount of losses occurs from scratch.
D. ZAKHAROV: Why?
A. ISAEV: Calculations in hindsight. That is, they were counted, the real losses in Bagration were only in the fall. And not even just in the fall, in September - they were counted only by November-December. Therefore, we can say that according to German data, according to ten days, the losses are estimated at almost 500 thousand people. Some of them went missing ... Again, if you look from June 20 to December 31, and remembering that everything was quiet in the fall, almost 300 thousand people, 286 thousand people disappeared without a trace. This, again, is the data for ten days. Although, at first they gave much lower values, that they had only 140 thousand missing people.
D. ZAKHAROV: Missing persons. I think these are the ones that ended up in these boilers, and they went unaccounted for.
A. ISAEV: Yes, the missing are those who were surrounded, and those who then walked the streets of Moscow on July 17, 1944.
D. ZAKHAROV: How many prisoners were taken during the operation?
A. ISAEV: 150 thousand prisoners. And this figure, despite the fact that it is often said that the data on prisoners were overestimated for various reasons, it can be considered as quite similar to the truth and confirmed, one might say, by the fact that 57 thousand were driven through the streets of Moscow, already on July 17 ... That is, immediately after the surrender of the boiler near Minsk.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, here I probably need to say a few words about this march through the streets of Moscow, because we have literally 2 minutes left.
A. ISAEV: Yes, so I will say it as briefly as possible. The fact is that in the West, where things, in fact, were not going very well, they doubted that, indeed, such a great success would be achieved. And then they performed an operation called "The Big Waltz", it was then a popular American film. Since July 11, Moscow has brought together more than 57 thousand German prisoners at the hippodrome, at the Dynamo stadium. And on July 17, announcing in the morning newspapers and on the radio - they had not said anything to anyone in advance - they were chased away on a march along Tverskaya and along the Garden Ring. They, as it were, went from the hippodrome and the Dynamo stadium to Mayakovsky square, then they were divided into 2 streams, across the Crimean bridge. the Kanatchikovo station and the Kurskiy railway station. And this procession was led by 19 generals who were captured, and only they were shaven. That is, in the morning they fed everyone with breakfast, and only the generals were allowed to shave. And so they were followed by this mass of people who had previously fled from stormtroopers through the forests. They looked miserable enough. Because wandering through the woods for several weeks, under strong psychological pressure, when your comrades are constantly being mowed down next to you - this, I think, made an indelible impression on them for the rest of their lives.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. This concludes our today's program is drawing to a close. I thank my guest Alexey Isaev for participating in the program. Then we will continue to fight and push the enemy in subsequent releases of the program. And with you, dear listeners and viewers, I say goodbye for a week to continue the cycle of our programs. All the best.
A. ISAEV: Goodbye.
PORTRAIT BY TIKHON DZYADKO
T. DZYADKO: Sergei Sokolov is one of the last marshals of the Soviet Union and one of only a few people of this rank still living today. In the Great Patriotic War, he did not have enough stars from the sky - he was young and served in various positions on different fronts. Although, he ends the war already as a colonel - this rank was awarded to him in September 1943. After the war, a very usual gradual ascent up the career ladder. He became Marshal in 1978, at which time Sokolov was an Army General and First Deputy Defense Minister. He has already visited the leadership of the Moscow military district, as well as directly the commander of the Leningrad military district.
Marshal Sokolov is one of those people whose name is associated with the fighting in Afghanistan. He is one of the leaders of the actions of the Soviet troops. For 5 years, he has been at the head of the task force of the Ministry of Defense, which means that he is engaged in interaction between the Soviet and Afghan forces, in fact planning the conduct of hostilities by them. For this, already in 1980, he became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and his top career was the post of Minister of Defense, which Sokolov held in 1984. Takes only 3 years before Matthias Rust's famous flight, landing on Red Square.
Here, conspiracy theories are already in play - to what extent the failure of the air defense was accidental or was everything a clearly planned action to cleanse the Armed Forces. Be that as it may, but the fact is the fact: Sokolov is retired and becomes an adviser in the Ministry of Defense. Here is the harsh irony of fate.
For many, in the perception of the Sokols, these are Afghanistan and Matias Rust, the 2 largest failures of the Soviet army and the Armed Forces. All this clearly covers other, more glorious pages in his biography.
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Current page: 1 (total of the book has 25 pages) [available passage for reading: 17 pages]
Alexey Isaev
Operation Bagration. "Stalin's Blitzkrieg" in Belarus
Introduction
In the first 12 days of Operation Bagration, from June 23 to July 4, 1944, Soviet troops, having broken into the enemy's defenses, defeated the main forces of Army Group Center, advanced from their initial position to the meridian west of Minsk by almost 240 km. This gave an average daily rate of advance of about 20 km per day. Such a crushing defeat seemed almost unbelievable. So incredible that they doubted the Soviet successes, and as proof of the reality of reports from Belarus in Moscow, they drove out columns of newly taken prisoners. The dull mass of soldiers in caps turned out to be the most convincing proof of the reality of the just catastrophe of the German army.
German prisoners of war walking along the Garden Ring became one of the most famous and significant events of the war in general and the summer of 1944 in particular. The accumulation of knowledge about that period forced us to take a fresh look at seemingly well-known personnel. The columns wandering around Moscow differed from the discordant and shabby crowd of "Volkssturmists" and "Hitler Youth" of 1945. The German generals who headed the columns of prisoners, at first perceived as rather abstract figures of the defeated enemy commanders, were identified over the years, and each of them had its own story.
In the first row of the column along the Moscow street that afternoon on July 17, 1944, there were three generals, they, in fact, led the procession of the "parade of the vanquished." In the middle walked a dryish general in a cap, with a cane and an overcoat thrown over his arm. His name was Paul Voelkers, and his last position was the command of the XXVII Army Corps. He led the corps from the summer of 1943. It was the XXVII Corps that for many months held the defense on the Moscow-Minsk highway on the outskirts of Orsha. These positions became the "Western Front All Quiet", the attempts of the Red Army to hack them time after time failed. They were attended by Soviet divisions that had become skilled in positional battles in the Western direction, and a fresh and large Polish infantry division. Next to Völkers was the short and overweight General Golwitzer, the former commander of the LIII Corps, which defended Vitebsk. The troops under his command held positions near Vitebsk for a long time, this city became a small "Verdun" of the Soviet-German front. What led the generals from a succession of successes in defense to a swift defeat and a humiliating march down a Moscow street drenched in the summer sun?
A column of German prisoners of war during the "march of the vanquished" in Moscow on July 17, 1944. 19 generals are marching in front of a compact group
In the context of events in the Western strategic direction, in general, "Bagration" looks like a real miracle. The positional front of Army Group Center, famous for its stubbornness since the time of the battles for Rzhev, was not just hacked with an advance of several tens of kilometers, it collapsed rapidly, the hostilities moved from protracted battles for the "forester's hut" to maneuverable actions and tank breakthroughs tens of kilometers a day.
German generals captured during Operation Bagration before the "march of the vanquished." Front row from left to right: Vincenz Müller (XII AK), Paul Voelkers (XXVII AK), Friedrich Hollwitzer (LIII AK), Kurt-Jürgen von Lützow (XXXV AK). In the second row, from left to right, Rudolf Bamler (12th infantry division), Walter Heine (6th divisional division), Adolf Haman (commandant of Bobruisk), Edmund Hoffmeister (383rd division), Gustav Gere (707th division, wearing a garrison cap)
Before the start of Operation Bagration, perhaps only desperate optimists could believe in a breakthrough at a rate of 20 km per day. Actually, before the outbreak of hostilities, the troops that arrived looked at the consequences of the winter battles without enthusiasm. Commander of the 11th Guards. army K. N. Galitsky in his memoirs unambiguously spoke about this:
“At the breakthrough area designated by the front commander, we saw the skeletons of dozens of our tanks burned out in previous battles. This picture led to sad reflections and reminded of the failures in this direction in the winter of 1944 " 1
Liberation of Belarus. 1944.M .: Nauka, 1970.S. 434.
The soldiers and officers of the four fronts in Belarus in June 1944, occupying trenches in the front line and places in combat vehicles in caponiers in the near rear, were not at all sure of their victory and success. Despite the fact that it was June 1944, which is associated in the memory of descendants with the victories of the last war summer. They didn't know all this. There remained reasonable doubts as to whether the next offensive would not be a failure or just a partial success with heavy losses. There was even greater concern in the headquarters of formations and associations - their inhabitants had much more information about the past months and the series of failures of their predecessors, and sometimes of their own. Anxiety about the result spurred and forced to work with redoubled and tripled energy. That is why the joy of the achieved success for all these people became special and poignant.
Therefore, the story of Operation Bagration will have to begin with the events of the winter of 1943/44, when the Red Army tried to crush the Center GA in a series of positional battles of varying degrees of failure. The confidence of the German command in the ability to hold positions in Belarus was largely based on this experience of many months of successful defense. Later, already during interrogation in Soviet captivity, the aforementioned former commander of the XXVII Army Corps, General Voelkers, said:
"In the area of the Central Army Group 2
This is how Heersgruppe Mitte, Army Group Center, was translated in Soviet documents of that period.
Local or limited-target attacks were expected. The High Command believed that the Central Army Group would be able to delay this advance of the Red Army, as it had done so far. " 3
TsAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12462, D. 292, L. 55.
Infantry General Paul Völkers knew what he was talking about: for many months, from October 1943, he commanded a corps defending the Minsk-Moscow highway and subjected to powerful attacks by Soviet troops. The fact that the German generals quite calmly looked at the Soviet preparations for the summer offensive was in no small part due to the success of the Wehrmacht in defense in the previous period.
This book is the first part of the work on Operation Bagration and chronologically covers the period from October 1943, when a positional front was formed in the Western direction, and up to the first stage of the Belarusian offensive operation (June 23 - July 4, 1944). In a word, from the formation to the crushing of the "Western Front All Quiet". Accordingly, it is divided into an overview of winter offensive operations, an analysis of the state of forces of the parties before the start of the summer campaign, and a story about the hostilities on June 22 (23) - July 4, 1944, which ended with the liberation of Minsk.
In view of the colossal scale of what was happening, a differentiated approach to the presentation of the material is absolutely necessary. Some episodes are covered in more detail, with a higher level of detail, some with less.
I would also like to say a few words about the sources used in writing this book. The situation with Soviet documents is paradoxical. On the one hand, in contrast to 1941-1942. the preservation of documents from 1944 is simply excellent. On the other hand, the demand for these documents was low.
Back in 1967, in his conversation with K. Simonov, A. M. Vasilevsky lamented: “It's amazing how little we use documents. Twenty years have passed since the end of the war, people remember, argue, but often argue without documents, without verification, which can be easily carried out. Quite recently, while looking for some documents, I found a huge amount of documents in one of the departments of the General Staff. Dispatches, negotiations on the most important operations of the war, which testify with absolute accuracy how things actually happened. But from the war itself to the present day, as these documents were laid, the way they are. Nobody looked into them ”.
I must say that A.M. Vasilevsky himself showed an example of how to do it. His article in the collection "Liberation of Belarus" in 1970 is full of documents taken from the encryption department of the General Staff (links to the fund 48a TsAMO). This made Alexander Mikhailovich's article one of the most informative, if not the most informative, in the entire collection. Unfortunately, she looked like a black sheep in a series of other materials. Undocumented disputes continue to this day. A typical example here is the story of the planning of the 1st Belorussian Front offensive and "two strikes". From work to work, the version from the memoirs of KK Rokossovsky is repeated, although the planning documents for "Bagration" lie on the surface. Less well-known was the story of the actions of the 5th Guards. tank army P.A.Rotmistrov and its use in two versions, also well readable from documents.
However, having the operational documents and knowing the sequence of events with an accuracy of the presentation in these documents, I want more - the motivation of the decisions made and the assessment of the situation. One of the problems here is the emasculation of many Soviet memoirs. The point is not even the usual exaggerations for this genre (although this issue will also be analyzed). The problem is precisely the loss of valuable information about what was happening. So, for example, the memoirs of A. S. Burdeyny in the same collection "Liberation of Belarus" are written as if by an agitator-propagandist, and not by a military general, who really distinguished himself in that operation. However, the dynamics of decision-making, seen in the documents, is simply absent. Information about the operational situation in the article, one might say, is zero. Such texts involuntarily evoke associations with the words of the character of the famous film L. Gaidai about "spaceships plying the Bolshoi Theater."
By 1944, the documents of both sides were kept at a high level, the experience of the war affected not only training, but also the formalization and detail of reporting. However, here the big problem was the massive loss of documents by German formations and formations in the final period of the war. It is all the more surprising that, contrary to expectations, the documents of the army level are well preserved: the logs of military operations, supplements to them of the 3rd tank, 9th, 4th and 2nd armies, which were part of the GA "Center". This makes it possible to reconstruct the picture of events and decisions taken at the army headquarters level.
At the same time, the defeat of the troops of the GA "Center" in Belarus inevitably led to a massive loss of operational documents, primarily divisional and corps level. You can even say more: the surviving and accessible documentation on a number of Wehrmacht formations ends just in the spring of 1944. In some cases, the surviving documents break off in June 1944. Thus, the surviving Journal of Combat Actions (ZhBD) of the LIII Army Corps, operating near Vitebsk, contains last entry dated June 17th. Other buildings have been partially preserved. So, according to XXXIX tank and VI army corps, ZhBD for June 1944 were preserved, but absent for later periods.
Of course, something became Soviet trophies. So, an almost complete set in the form of a journal of military operations of the 3rd Panzer Army and its supplements is present in the so-called 500th fund of TsAMO, that is, the fund of trophy documents, after the war it was transferred. And what is curious, the Soviet troops got one of the copies of the magazine, another copy was preserved at the headquarters of the 3rd Panzer Army and already became a trophy of the allies, was subsequently microfilmed in the United States.
At the same time, the loss of some, traditional, sources about the activities of the German troops during the "Bagration" period coexisted with the appearance of others, less widespread. Here the grandeur of the catastrophe in Belarus worked for historians. In the course of work to disband and reorganize the formations of Army Group Center in late summer and autumn 1944, officers and even soldiers and junior commanders who had left the encirclement were questioned about the events of late June and early July. Actually, it was common after major defeats. The same kind of reports were written by the commanders of the Red Army who came out of the Bialystok-Minsk and Kiev "cauldrons".
It would be more accurate to say that the surviving participants in the events in Belarus described in a narrative form the sequence of events that led the GA "Center" to complete collapse. Some of the advantages of such stories over dry Kriegstagebuchs 4
KTB - Combat Journal.
It is a living narrative, in which the narrators most often did not skimp on personal emotional assessments of what was happening. At the same time, the requirements for the reports were formalized, which did not allow the writers to get off with general words. These requirements looked like this:
“Everyone involved in processing the affairs of the division must, by 11.9.44, submit a short report on the participation of the division in battles from 20.6.44. Among other things, it should contain:
1) Divisional sector and main line of defense at 20.6.44.
2) command post of division headquarters, 1b and, if possible, regiments at 20.6.44.
3) The general state of the division (fully operational, replenished or assembled from several units, etc.).
4) The beginning of the enemy's attacks - in which direction, new frontiers, the result.
5) Retreat - when and in what direction, new frontiers, results.
6) Data (briefly) about the experience gained by the division during the withdrawal, for example, enemy lines of defense, partisans, the fate of individual units, combat groups, regiments, etc., the fate of commanders and headquarters " 5
NARA T78 R139 frame 6068504.
This formalization certainly benefited the written documents. As you can see from the list of requirements, they were oriented towards the accumulation of experience. It is possible that it was their understanding that led to the emergence of the "wandering cauldron" tactics characteristic of the period of the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945. One way or another, the reports make it possible to some extent compensate for the loss of operational documents of the formations in the eyes of the historian.
An equally curious source is the interrogation of captured German generals. "Bagration" was unusually "fruitful" for high-ranking prisoners of war. Of course, mostly German generals were interviewed for purely utilitarian purposes about the state of the Wehrmacht as a whole. However, the interrogations also contain descriptions of events at the front and their personal assessments by the generals. Part of this information was used in Soviet writings on Bagration, for example, the interrogation of General Trout, commander of the 78th Infantry Division, is often quoted.
In general, it can be stated that a set of documents available to an ordinary researcher (that is, without any special rights) for describing Operation Bagration at the modern level is present in the archives. Only their cyclopean volume can stop here due to the grandeur of the operation itself.
Section one
"Quiet on the Western Front ..."
The version of the history of the Great Patriotic War, familiar from textbooks and films, can lead to the conclusion that there are striking differences between the First and Second World Wars. Perhaps the formation of a stable opinion and even confidence that the positional battles of Paschendale, Somme, Gallipoli and Verdun safely remained the property of the war of 1914-1918. However, it is not. World War II just turned out to be more diverse. It combined both maneuverable operations, in which tanks covered 30-50 km, or even 100 km per day, and positional battles that lasted for many months, the advance in which was sometimes calculated in units of kilometers, or even hundreds of meters. ...
One of the paradoxes of the history of the war is that the most impressive success of the Soviet armed forces - the defeat of GA Center during Operation Bagration - was achieved after a series of failures in the western strategic direction from October 1943 to April 1944. while in Ukraine the Red Army was successfully advancing and liberating a huge territory, the Western Front was practically marking time. The successes of the neighboring 1st Baltic and Belorussian fronts were rather limited. The result was a trial by a special committee of the State Defense Committee with organizational conclusions and organizational changes, including the removal of a number of front command personnel and the division of the Western Front.
For a long time, the western direction remained problematic for the Red Army. 1942 was marked by bloody positional battles in the Moscow direction. Of course, the positional battles themselves were, in terms of absolute numbers of losses (especially irrecoverable ones), better than retreats and encirclements in the southern sector of the front. However, after the success of offensive operations in the south, starting with Uranus, this already dubious advantage began to lose its significance.
The traditional excuse for the "unfinished" (or, to call a spade a spade - failed) operations of the Red Army in the western strategic direction has become the thesis of "shackling" the enemy. So, in the 12-volume Brezhnev volume, it was stated: “Through active operations throughout the winter and the first spring months, the 1st Baltic, Western and 1st Belorussian fronts pinned down the main forces of command at the expense of its forces to provide assistance to army groups "South", "A" and "North", which suffered at that time the hardest defeats " 6
History of the Second World War 1939-1945 Volume 8. The collapse of the defensive strategy of the fascist bloc. M .: Voenizdat, 1977.S. 137.
In the same way, the failures of the offensives near Rzhev in 1942 were justified (and to this day are justified). I must say that this excuse appeared in hot pursuit of events. Even then, in the spring of 1944, the head of the operational department of the 33rd Army, Colonel I.A.Tolkonyuk, in his letter to I.V. Stalin 7
See Appendix for full details.
Wrote the following:
“Among some of the leading officials of our army there is an opinion [...] that we have fully achieved the goal that was set before us, pinning down the enemy in front of our front, preventing the transfer of his forces to the south, where large-scale operations are being conducted. This opinion seems to me to be wrong, and I disagree with it.
A simple calculation shows that with the forces and resources expended during the described period on the Western Front, it was possible to carry out one or two serious and well-prepared operations, break through the enemy's defense front at least 20-30 km of the front, build on success and not only pin down the enemy , but to liberate a large territory, or to attract a significant part of the enemy's forces from other directions, or, due to large defeats, force him to an operational withdrawal " 8
TsAMO RF. F. 388. Op. 8712 D. 736. L. 107.
Indeed, the success of "Bagration" in the summer of 1944 confirmed the words of Tolkonyuk - after the collapse of the GA "Center" front, the Germans were forced to hastily transfer divisions from Army Group "Northern Ukraine" to Belarus and the Baltic states. Thus, the prerequisites were created for the successful implementation of the Lvov-Sandomierz operation and access to the Vistula. To this we can add that Army Group Center in the winter of 1943/44 held its positions almost exclusively with infantry, the most valuable mobile formations of the German army were concentrated in the southern sector of the Eastern Front. Suffice it to say that not a single Panther tank was opposed to the Soviet Western Front in winter positional battles, they operated to the south or north (in GA Sever). For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that in modern domestic historiography, primarily at the suggestion of M.A.
In 1943, the situation seemed to get off the ground. Already at the beginning of the year, the hated Rzhevsky ledge was evacuated. The failure of the "Citadel" and the success of the Soviet counteroffensive made it possible to bring down the GA "Center" from its familiar positions. In the course of the successful Smolensk operation, the troops of the Western Front achieved the cherished goal of the Soviet offensives in 1942 - the city of Smolensk.
However, it was during this period that positional defense was elevated to the dominant principle of warfare: Hitler announced the construction of the so-called Eastern Wall. On August 12, 1943, the Wehrmacht High Command's Combat Journal noted: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces transfers to the commands of the four army groups on the Eastern Front the Fuhrer's order No. 10 on the immediate construction of the Eastern Wall." It was supposed to become a defensive line on which it was supposed to wear down the Red Army in positional defensive battles, inflict losses and force the signing of a peace. According to the plan, the Eastern Wall was to consist of the so-called Wotan Line in the zone of Army Groups A and South and the Panther Line in the zone of Army Groups Center and North. Thus, the Eastern Rampart formed a continuous barrier from the Sea of Azov to the Baltic Sea, passing along the Kerch Peninsula, the Molochnaya River, Dnieper Plains, the middle course of the Dnieper, the Sozh River to Gomel, further east of Orsha, Vitebsk, Nevel, Pskov and along the Narva River.
It was to this Panther-Stellung line, which had been under construction for several weeks, that the troops of Army Group Center retreated in the fall of 1943 after the defeat at Smolensk.
D. ZAKHAROV: Good evening, the program "The Price of Victory" is on the air, and I am its host Dmitry Zakharov. Today my guest is Alexey Isaev.
A. ISAEV: Good evening.
D. ZAKHAROV: Historian, great specialist in the history of the war. Vitaly Dymarsky is absent today. As is customary, I remind you the phone number for SMS is +7 985 970-45-45. So, let's get down to our today's topic "Operation Bagration". We received a fairly large number of perfectly sane questions. I suppose, Alexey, have you seen them already?
A. ISAEV: Yes.
D. ZAKHAROV: But before we start answering the questions, we probably need to make a small preamble and tell not about how the battle began, but how the preparation and development of the operation proceeded, and the accompanying events that made it possible to carry it out successfully.
A. ISAEV: Well, of course, both sides were preparing for the summer campaign, and the German command, led by Hitler, considered that their opponents would strike a powerful blow from Ukraine, from the territory that was liberated in the winter of 1943-1944 and cut off 2 groups at once armies. It cannot be said that such grandiose plans were never hatched by the Soviet command before. So, there was such a plan, "Polar Star", when they were going to cut off the entire Army Group "North". Likewise, during Operation Big Saturn, they could cut off 2 army groups at once with a strike on Rostov after Stalingrad. However, in the real summer of 1944, the Soviet command had completely different plans.
I must say that at first the situation developed, as they say, wherever you go, everywhere a wedge. In Ukraine, indeed, great successes were achieved, but large mechanized formations of the enemy also gathered here. Lots of tanks. By that time, there were not many new T-34-85s. And the prospects for the development of these successful strikes - they were, in fact, vague, and such a person as Shtymenko, one of the major Soviet staff officers, frankly writes about this. In Belarus, too, the situation was not sugar.
D. ZAKHAROV: Belarusian balcony.
A. ISAEV: Yes, there was a Belarusian balcony, which could not be touched. During the entire winter campaign, he was hammered from all sides, but the results were, frankly, disappointing. Moreover, in the spring of 1944, a commission of the State Defense Committee passed, as a result of which heads flew. That is, people were removed from the command, in particular, Sokolovsky was removed from the command of the Western Front, and it seemed not a good idea to continue pounding his forehead into this Belorussian balcony. But nevertheless, it was decided to do just that, to try to destroy this gigantic Balcony, which hung both over Ukraine and prevented it from breaking through to the Baltic states.
And we can say how the reinforcement of those troops that were supposed to attack it, sent, first, new commanders instead of those removed following the results of the winter campaign. They sent Chernikhovsky, the man who became the front commander at 38 years old. This is a man who distinguished himself when crossing the Dnieper, and he was appointed commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front. In general, the fronts were cut more finely so that the commanders could sit closer to the troops and see what was happening.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, more flexible.
A. ISAEV: More flexible management. They sent the conqueror of the Crimea Zakharov, a man of quite complex nature, who, first of all, arrived at the 2nd Belorussian Front, began to teach them how to live, how to attack by Crimean standards. But they quickly explained to him that in the forests of Belarus, these techniques of his that he offers are completely useless. And, in general, Shtymenko, whom I mentioned, who was also sent by an observer from the headquarters, was a kind of counterbalance to the rather energetic, one might say, authoritarian Zakharov. And he constantly pulled him back. And in fact, they had such a relationship, to put it mildly, complicated. As, however, with the commanders of armies and even divisions.
Therefore, the planning went very carefully, because the main thing was not to frighten the enemy away. It was clear that yes, most of the mechanized formations in Ukraine, but if the Germans sniff out something, that's all. These forests, a small number of roads - they could play a fatal role.
D. ZAKHAROV: Swampy area.
A. ISAEV: Yes, swampy terrain - all this could lead to a repetition of the winter campaign, when we wedge shallowly, the offensive stops, losses, but no result. The risk was great. And enough camouflage measures were deployed.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. The famous campaign to create a pseudo shock wedge north of Chisinau.
A. ISAEV: Yes, north of Chisinau, and, in fact, it was not even necessary to imitate, because most of the tank armies remained in Ukraine, but, nevertheless, firstly, there was a tough radio silence and some of the Germans said that the Russians, contrary to their custom, observed complete radio silence. One of them even put it this way: "I felt that something was wrong precisely because of the complete silence on the air." All marches took place at night. For this, the tailgate of the car and the hood were painted white, and it was strictly forbidden to make any overtaking. And so, in single file, one can say how the blind, again, by the bright white painted signs of the car, moved at night. If morning came, it was necessary to stop and hide in the forest.
PO-2 and Kukuruzniki planes constantly flew around the areas where the troops were concentrated. And those who violated the camouflage, they immediately dropped the pennant. It was, one might say, humiliating. That is, to any commander: "Here, and we see you." Naturally, they tried to avoid it with all their might. And in the daytime - movement only in the opposite direction. And there were about 100 cars to the front, which were allowed to travel around the clock. But this, again, was strictly regulated.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. But back to planning. Here was the decision to strike in 6 places, if my memory serves me. Here, one of our listeners asks: “Why was such a decision made? Here, not in one place to hit or from the flanks to try to bypass in 2 places, namely to carry out some deconcentration. Was there a certain risk in this? "
A. ISAEV: Well, generally speaking, the terrain was difficult and it was dangerous to move large masses of troops. In addition, the concentration of tank armies in one place would have been noticed anyway. Therefore, they distributed the blows along the front, and wanted to bring down the German front gradually. Moreover, there is a known story - and one of our listeners asked a question about it - about how Rokossovsky asked his front to deliver 2 blows. Zhukov insisted that there was one blow, and Rokossovsky said: "Let us hit Bobruisk from two sides."
And I must say that shortly before the operation Zhukov, who went to the area where the main blow from the east to Bobruisk was supposed to be, he said: “Nothing, nothing, you will break through to Bobruisk, we will lend you a hand. We will pull you out of those swamps where you are going to attack. " And Rokossovsky remained just south of Bobruisk. He was confident that where he hit, the Germans are weaker, even if the terrain is worse, and they will achieve more success. He managed to demand it, and in a conversation with Stalin personally. When they said to him: “Are you sure that you should strike 2 blows? Go out to another room, think, come back. " And so he returned 3 times like this - this is one of such famous stories about how they persuaded him to act as Zhukov advises. But nevertheless, he defended his decision and Stalin said: "Yes, let him act like this." And it helped in the future, in fact.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, I probably need to say a few words about the preparation of support. About 390 thousand tons of ammunition were brought there. Only ammunition.
A. ISAEV: Yes. And by the way, the operation was postponed relative to the time when it was supposed to start according to plans. Stalin, when the allies landed, he wrote to Churchill ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Alexey, excuse me, here's another question from the listener: “Was the start of Operation Bagration agreed with the allies? Or did everything happen? .. "
A. ISAEV: It was agreed to start a major operation of some kind. In Tehran, it was decided, indeed, under pressure from the USSR and the Americans, that we were landing in Normandy, and at the same time it was promised that an offensive would begin in the east. And, indeed, on the first day of the landing in Normandy, Stalin wrote to Churchill that an offensive would begin in mid-June in the near future. But in mid-June it did not start, precisely because the ammunition was being brought up. Moreover, the southern fronts, exactly where Rokossovsky was, they eventually began the operation a day later. And in fact, the operation began on June 22, but no one deliberately thought about the 3rd anniversary of the war - it really happened that way. Moreover, the beginning of the operation on June 23 remains in history.
D. ZAKHAROV: Before we start fighting, I probably need to say a few more words about the specifics of the area. Swampy, wooded. That is, these are the events that were held in this context. Because the sapper work there was, of course, probably the most large-scale in the entire war.
A. ISAEV: Yes, first of all, indeed, it is wooded and swampy. When it was necessary to lay the gates and tests were carried out, how the tanks would drive along these gates. And also the front, after all, it stood there for a long time and the Germans managed to bury themselves well and make developed minefields. And the decision was made on continuous mine clearance. I read the report of the GABTU, the armored vehicle directorate, there was such a phrase - you can say that now it seems funny, then it was, perhaps, sad - that the greatest danger to tanks at the beginning of the offensive is represented by mines, in brackets "especially their own" ... And "especially their own" - they were cleared of mines by a solid. Moreover, in order not to frighten off the enemy, they simply twisted the fuses out of them.
Unfortunately, the Soviet memories of "Bagration" - they are written like a blueprint, that, here, we had continuous swamps, but we figured out how to break through these swamps. In fact, everything was not so bad, and this engineering training, some kind of wet shoes - it played, rather, a supporting role. First of all, it was precisely the identification of the enemy's defense system, the accumulation of sufficient forces in order to deliver a blow that would not be repelled. And most importantly: the Germans have assembled a tank fist in the Ukraine. They had 7 tank divisions in Army Group Northern Ukraine. In Belarus in all groups of the army "Center" 1 tank division. And, in fact, they had no reserves to seal the breakthroughs. What they had time to do before, again, in the winter of 1943-1944, before that near Rzhev - this is all at the expense of tank divisions, which: Soviet troops broke through somewhere, Panzerwaffe immediately rushes there and stands up as a wall. And, as a rule, it was difficult to break through this wall.
And in Belarus, Army Group Center was essentially a colossus with feet of clay. But this colossus had to be hit hard enough for it to fall off its feet of clay. And the point was precisely in this strong blow.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. The Germans were commanded there by a man with the iconic surname Bush.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Naturally, he is not a relative of American presidents.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. But, as it were, just as successful.
A. ISAEV: Well, in fact, he defended quite successfully in Army Group North. And when Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center for several years, got into a car accident, they took Bush from Army Group North precisely so that he would normally defend secondary directions. The genius of defense Model was in Army Group Northern Ukraine, where it was believed that it was there that they would strike and go to cut off to the Baltic Sea, and immediately 2 army groups would disappear, if not to stand up as a wall. This wall was built there, and "not the genius of defense" Bush got the Army Group "Center". Moreover, he was so sure, again, himself, that they would not hit where he was in command, that 2 days before the start of the Soviet offensive, he went on vacation.
D. ZAKHAROV: What Hitler later recalled to him.
A. ISAEV: Yes, of course, he was later remembered, but, nevertheless, many ... This, now, more precisely, after the war, the German commanders are actively blaming Hitler, but they were really sure, and some intelligence reports on preparations in Belarus - this is an auxiliary operation in order to distract from this powerful global strike at Kovel.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, let's move on to some statistics - this is what the Red Army had at the time of the start of the operation, and, accordingly, the adversaries.
A. ISAEV: Yes. There was a question from one of the listeners regarding the balance of forces in the air and how the actions of the allies actually influenced. You need to immediately answer directly: yes, they did. The Reich Air Force, which provided German air defense, at that time consisted of almost 1,400 aircraft. The 3rd Air Fleet in the West - more than 500. Accordingly, the 6th Air Fleet in Belarus has 600 aircraft.
D. ZAKHAROV: All types.
A. ISAEV: Yes, of all types. This is an important clarification, since it included 300 2-engine bombers, even 4-engine Henkel-177 with twin engines. And they had to hit Soviet strategic targets from this forward-facing Balcony.
By 1944, the Germans, as it were, one might say, woke up and thought that it would be nice to wage some kind of strategic war. Drawn near Velikie Luki by some kind of Soviet communications. But, in a word, they assembled 300 2-engine bombers, which were to repel the offensive neither mind nor heart. And there were fighters in the 6th Air Fleet as of May 31, the last reporting date - 60. I emphasize: not 660, but by June 22 as a result of strikes on airfields, any air battles, 40 of them remained before the operation. fronts and even long-range bomber aviation to them - 5675 Soviet aircraft, including 1800 attack aircraft, 400 PO-2 light and 2500 fighters.
D. ZAKHAROV: In general, there was nothing to catch.
A. ISAEV: Yes, indeed, there was nothing to catch. Because, again, exactly the same as with tanks, when Army Group Center had 10% of German tanks on the eastern front and not a single Panther. In general, the tank is produced for a year - there was not a single tank of this type in Belarus at all, neither combat-ready, not at all.
And it's the same with aviation. When most of the attack aircraft, which could attack the advancing Soviet tank columns, when fighters. In Belarus there are 2 groups of fighters, in Ukraine - 7. The difference is very significant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, is the group a regiment?
A. ISAEV: Yes.
D. ZAKHAROV: An analogue of our regiment.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Well, if you look at the last reporting date, then 60 versus 140. In general, the difference by German standards is quite significant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Against 140 in Ukraine, I mean.
A. ISAEV: Yes, 140 in Ukraine in the 4th Air Fleet. And in the 6th - respectively, 60. Naturally, then some kind of transfers began, but, nevertheless, on the first day ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, that's just ridiculous.
A. ISAEV: 5600 Soviet aircraft. This is, indeed, a very serious advantage, and it, in fact, allowed to shatter this balcony, which is quite durable. And from experience they decided that let the attack aircraft not hit the front line, let them hit the artillery.
D. ZAKHAROV: Which was wise.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Because the artillery that hits from a closed position is invisible. That is, a person on the front line going on the attack may not even see the enemy and die. But these positions of artillery, which from the air, one might say, from a bird's eye view, are a sitting duck. That is, there are guns, gunners are scurrying around them, ammunition piles are nearby.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. And considering that it is in the 2nd echelon.
A. ISAEV: Yes, it is deep, it is all open. Well, actually, from the air, this can be said to be a very soft target. And this soft target was attacked in the first place. And with complete impunity, well, practically with impunity, precisely because the opposition was insignificant.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Tanks?
A. ISAEV: Tanks. The Germans, as I said, had 11% of all the tanks on the eastern front - that's about 530 tanks and self-propelled guns. There were actually fewer tanks. Most of the armored vehicles were distributed among the infantry divisions.
D. ZAKHAROV: Do we have tanks?
A. ISAEV: We had 4,000 tanks. Tanks and self-propelled guns, of course, included the SU-76 with bulletproof armor. They were gaining, of course, numbers, but, nevertheless, putting them one on one with the Sturmgeschutz self-propelled guns, which has 80 mm armor and, in general, a tough nut to crack for most Soviet armored vehicles, is not worth it. But nevertheless, the ratio was exactly that - 1 to 8.
And the main thing to evaluate is the number of mobile connections. The Germans had 1 tank and 2 tank-grenadier divisions. That is, there were not enough reserves that could jump up from their seats, run to plug the breakthrough. We were discharged from near Odessa Pliev's group, horse-mechanized, when the mechanized corps and the cavalry corps. And this group was sent just to the place that Rokossovsky had chosen for himself. That is, dense forests, swamps, but, nevertheless, this mass of trucks and cavalry - it could break through them. They used this discharged Pliev, Rotmistrov's tank army - it was also from the southerners, that is, those who were advancing in the southwestern direction. We already talked about her when we talked about Korsun-Shevchenkovsky - that she was sent to Belarus. And a sufficient advantage was achieved precisely due to the fact that they concentrated their efforts against Belarus, against the Army Group Center.
D. ZAKHAROV: Human power - 2.6 million, if my memory serves me right. A. ISAEV: Well, just the same, 2.6 - this is calculated not quite accurately. If you take such a book "Operations of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War", then there the forces for "Bagration" are estimated at 1 million 200 thousand.
D. ZAKHAROV: How is this discrepancy in statistics?
A. ISAEV: First, at the expense of the rear units, which were located quite deep in the rear. Secondly, due to the fact that the 1st Belorussian Front of Rokossovsky, which at first did not participate - it was over a million - it was calculated entirely in Bagration, although half of it actually participated in the operation, even less than half - there are about 430 thousand. Therefore, 2.5 thousand came running, and they were opposed.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, 2 and a half.
A. ISAEV: Yes. And it so happened that with this calculation of all the troops ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes, everyone counted.
A. ISAEV: They counted everything, really. This may be the correct approach, but, nevertheless, it does not give a real picture. Because if you look at the forces that went directly to the offensive in June-July 1944, they are in a fairly significant source of the "Operation of the Soviet Armed Forces" - it was stamped "Secret" in the late 50s. This is 1 million 200 thousand. Accordingly, Army Group Center had 900,000 men, including about 400,000 in the rear. Therefore, the balance of power - it was, nevertheless, not as devastating as it seems, if you count 2.5 million.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, if we consider purely German combatants.
A. ISAEV: Yes, if we consider the combatants, the ratio is slightly more than 2 to 1.
D. ZAKHAROV: We will continue ... Or rather, we will launch a victorious offensive after the news is released. I thank Alexey for coming and telling me so interestingly. And with you, dear listeners and viewers, we will meet immediately after the break for the news block.
D. ZAKHAROV: Good evening again, dear listeners of the Echo of Moscow radio station and viewers of the RTVi channel. The program "The Price of Victory" is on the air, and I, its host Dmitry Zakharov. Vitaly Dymarsky is not here today, and my guest is the historian Alexei Isaev, with whom we are discussing Operation Bagration.
Before we continue the discussion, I will remind you of our phone number for SMS-letters: +7 985 970-45-45. So, Alexey, finally, let's get started. Prepared, concentrated, brought in ammunition, courage and food, now you can attack.
A. ISAEV: Yes. It all started on the right flank of the advancing troops. Accordingly, on the left flank of the Germans. There they had such a fortress Vitebsk. In general, Hitler by that time came to the idea of such fortresses, which are placed in communication centers. They had to be held back at all costs. The idea, in fact, is not the stupidest one, but, nevertheless, at that time the German military leaders, one might say, sabotaged it. So, this Vitebsk, which held out in the previous winter, was defeated in just a few days. We shifted the direction of the blows, hit a little further. That is, not in those, one might say, dents that were achieved in winter, but slightly to the side. And literally in 2 days we managed to create a threat of encirclement. Naturally, the commander of the 3rd Panzer Army Reinhardt said: "Let's take it all away," he was told: "No." That is, Bush played the role of a simple translator of Hitler's orders. Although he tried to politely address upstairs: "Maybe we will take it all the same?" But, nevertheless, when he was told "No", he said: "Well, okay," and broadcast it down. And, accordingly, Vitebsk was surrounded very quickly. We tried to break out of it, and Hitler said that “no, let’s you sit in this fortress. And send an officer of the General Staff there. " That is, this is not from the German General Staff, but simply such a title that a person has an academic education. To which Reinhardt enthusiastically said: “Such a wonderful order, my Fuhrer, I must deliver personally. I myself will jump with a parachute to Vitebsk. " Naturally, Hitler was taken aback and the question of someone jumping with a parachute to Vitebsk, delivering this, of course, an important order, it was closed. But, nevertheless, on the radio the garrison was told: "The division must remain in this fortress and state the name of the commander." The commander's name was Hitter. General Hitter, however, held out for literally 12 hours compared to the bulk of the defenders of Vitebsk, the corps of such General Gollwitzer. And also literally in the morning Gollwitzer went to break through, and in the evening Hitter thought that there was a prospect, “Well, this Vitebsk,” and he also rushed into the forests south-west of the city. There, in fact, the Germans were surrounded, intensively rolled away with these attack aircraft, which could act with practically impunity, and the Germans surrendered rather quickly. Both Gollwitzer and Hitter were captured. Subsequently, they were among those who walked through Moscow. That, if time remains, I think that the March of the Vanquished, too, can be told.
One way or another, the Vitebsk fortress fell. And a 150-kilometer gap formed in the German front. It was a breach on their left flank. In the meantime, things were going well for Rokossovsky. Despite the fact that Zhukov said “Yes, we will lend you a hand, but we will pull you out of the swamps,” nevertheless, the offensive, which, in fact, Zhukov watched and which was carried out by Gorbatov's army, did not develop very quickly.
Despite a powerful strike by bombers at night, Soviet long-range aviation. And what is interesting, they put trucks on the bridgehead and turned on the headlights on them so that they shine in the rear. The Germans did not see them from the front, but from above it was perfectly visible, this line, a chain of lights, so they bombed well. But, nevertheless, the offensive was developing not shaky, not roll. Moreover, this only German tank division moved in there. And it could well have been a repetition near Bobruisk, that is, on the right flank of the Germans, what was already in winter. But this is Rokossovsky's idea that we will break through the swamps, it worked. There, the defense was weaker and the mechanized cavalry group of Pliev was quickly introduced into the breakthrough, the tank corps and Rokossovsky held out his hand. He quickly broke through to Bobruisk, and this is the only German tank division, when a serious crisis arose south of the city, it was turned 180 degrees and it rushed to extinguish the fire there. While she was running from south to north, from north to south, the front was broken through and another cauldron was formed, this time near Bobruisk. There, the 9th Army got into this cauldron, the same army that defended Rzhev, which was advancing near Kursk. And she, finally, after, in general, many months, when they tried to break her, she was broken. Indeed, in just a few days, its defenses collapsed.
At this moment - it was June 28 - Bush was removed and put in his place as the genius of defense, Model. I must say that Model did not save his army, which he commanded, the 9th. In fact, he left her to fend for herself, he understood that it was necessary to restore the front. And there weren't any deblocking strikes, in fact.
D. ZAKHAROV: A small remark is probably needed here, because these two breakthroughs with a total front length of 450 kilometers - they were just a verdict, in fact.
A. ISAEV: Yes. There, even the common front was about 700 kilometers, and there were 2 breaches on the right and left flanks. It turned out to be classic Cannes. The Germans had a mass of infantry. And here is this infantry, which is the 4th German army, which with a part stood on the eastern bank of the Dnieper. In June 1944, the Germans still held a foothold on the eastern bank of the Dnieper, that is, one might say, it was a psychological thing, of course, but, nevertheless. And this mass of infantry had to get up and run with all its might to Minsk. Because both flanks have been broken through, and Soviet mechanized units are marching towards Minsk from the north and south. They had to compete in running speed with Soviet tanks.
D. ZAKHAROV: Yes. This is not an easy task.
A. ISAEV: Yes, the task is not easy, besides, the Soviet infantry was pressing from the front. And this mass - it rushed first to the Berezina River. At first they thought to keep the front there.
D. ZAKHAROV: Berezina is generally a cursed place.
A. ISAEV: Yes, Berezina is a cursed place for the invaders. In 1812, Napoleon tried to retreat there very unsuccessfully, and the same thing happened with the 4th Army, which was marching towards Minsk and on the way to Berezina they had one crossing, which was constantly bombed. These columns of infantry were constantly ironed by attack aircraft. Then the Germans said that they were attacked with small anti-tank bombs. The Germans had almost no tanks, and instead of tanks, the infantry became the target of these small bombs. And when they poured thousands of these bombs, they mowed the German infantry like sheaves of straw. Because there are many small fragments, quite strong explosions, and they covered a large area. This crossing over the Berezina - there were constant scandals. The military police simply disappeared and, in fact, who was more energetic, who was more strong-willed, he broke through to this crossing. It was constantly bombed, the bridge was held, one might say, on a living thread, they tried to establish some other crossings there. But, nevertheless, it was a march of the doomed, since the tanks were going to Minsk and they were trying to stop them, of course. The model with him from Army Group "Northern Ukraine" took tanks. He threw the 5th tank division against the Soviet tank columns marching on Minsk.
D. ZAKHAROV: Who went to Minsk?
A. ISAEV: First, this is Rotmistrov. Secondly, these are several tank corps from the Rokossovsky army, and from the Zakharov front. That is, there were several contenders for Minsk. And this 5th Panzer Division - why am I staying on it - because it was one of two divisions that was fully equipped. It had 159 tanks, half of which were Panthers. She was given a full-blooded "Tigers" battalion, that is, 45 "Tigers". More than 200 tanks, more than half - "Tigers" and "Panthers". And Rotmistrov did not have a single T-34-85 in July 1944.
D. ZAKHAROV: But they just started.
A. ISAEV: Yes. Whoever listened to previous programs about the fate of the T-34, he knows what it is about. Well, I think a lot of people know. I specifically checked the documents: Rotmistrov's army received the first T-34-85 at the end of July - at the beginning of August. And, behold, 2 tank corps of Rotmistrov's army crashed at full speed into this 5th tank division with "Tigers" and "Panthers", and the battle turned out, naturally, not in favor of Rotmistrov. They even sent a special investigation - by the way, Shtymenko writes about this, as they say, in the remote Soviet years he wrote about it there. Everyone who wrote about Bagration is considering this episode.
Indeed, the Germans managed to restrain Rotmistrov. And he was unlucky, frankly. Because to run into, even with several hundred tanks for 200 tanks, half of them - "Panthers" and "Tigers" - it was not fun. But since he was not the only contender for Minsk, this one German division, of course, could not build a solid front. And the neighboring corps advancing along the next route, again, from the southerners, from those who fought near Kursk, who attacked in Ukraine - this is Burdeyny's 2nd Tatsinsky Guards Corps - it entered Minsk. From the south, respectively, entered the 1st Guards Tank Corps from the Rokossovsky front. This happened on the 3rd of July. And this mass of German infantry, which was hurrying first to the Berezina, and then to Minsk, was surrounded. Naturally, they lost this race for Minsk on foot. And this large mass is all - it gathered to the east of Minsk, it was gradually squeezed, again ironed by attack aircraft, and even from this cauldron such telegrams were heard that "we will disband such and such a division, such and such a corps." And their resistance was quickly eliminated. That is, they were surrounded on July 3, and the resistance ended by July 11.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, in general, of course, the pace of the operation, if compared with all the previous ones, is absolutely fantastic. 10 days - and the development of such success. In my opinion, this had never happened before Bagration.
A. ISAEV: Yes, before "Bagration" from a static front to a complete defeat - it really happened very quickly. And, in principle, the rate did not even expect such a quick collapse of this Belarusian balcony. A colossus with feet of clay, struck hard enough, fell.
D. ZAKHAROV: I wonder how they digested all this in Berlin?
A. ISAEV: Naturally, in Berlin it was digested without enthusiasm. And Model, in principle, he gave all these infantry masses to the slaughter and tried to build a new front. In fact, if you look ahead, then they managed to stop the advance of Soviet troops only on the Vistula. That is, from Minsk to the Vistula, these were restraining actions, when tank divisions with the same "Tigers", with "Panthers" - they tried to hold back, but they, in general, did not succeed very much and the operation developed. That is, they moved further to the walls of East Prussia, to the Baltic states.
It must be said here that the Panther line, on which they stopped in the spring of 1944, was bypassed. This is the barrier that the Germans built in the Baltics, thanks to Bagration, it was bypassed. And as a result of this, one might say casually. Estonia was liberated. When the Panther was simply hit bypassing this line, again, in a few days, the Estonian corps of Pern was sent, he covered 100 kilometers in a day, went to Tallinn. And they managed to quickly recapture the Baltic states, to lock up a certain number of Germans on the Courland Peninsula. But, nevertheless, the result exceeded all expectations.
A. ISAEV: August 29, yes. Because, in principle, this is even the development of "Bagration", because, again, it is connected with this ...
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, this is a bonus.
A. ISAEV: Yes, a bonus. This is connected with one of the controversies of the Soviet strategy, when both Zhukov and Vasilevsky said: “But let's strike at East Prussia? And we will capture it. "
D. ZAKHAROV: Right off the bat?
A. ISAEV: Yes. “And now we will seize her with a cavalry charge. Both the Baltics and East Prussia ”. The Baltic states - there they went to the Baltic Sea on July 30, there even the mechanized corps commanders specially said: "Get some water, sign that you took it from the Baltic Sea and came." At the meeting of the rate, there was a bottle on the table that it was from the Baltic Sea. It was such an episode, in general, confirmed. And so the idea was: "Yes, let's break through to East Prussia." She really had almost nothing to defend. But Stalin considered it better, nevertheless, to concentrate his efforts in Poland. Therefore, the reserves, yes, were given, again, to the Ukraine, the Lvov-Sandomierz operation began. The question was asked: "Where was the Ukrainian Galicia division defeated?" Here she was defeated under the fords during the Lvov-Sandomierz. This is not "Bagration", this is what followed him.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, today we will not touch Lvovsko-Sandomirskaya.
A. ISAEV: Yes, we will not touch it, but the fact is that, again, it goes through both Zhukov's memoirs and Vasilevsky's memoirs that their proposal to take East Prussia with a cavalry charge was rejected precisely in favor of to advance to Poland.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, it was probably correct. Because, in general, Prussia turned out to be quite bloody.
A. ISAEV: Well, Prussia turned out to be bloody. Again, as it were, both Zhukov and Vasilevsky say that "but then it was soft." That is, then it was possible to take lukewarm. But this is from the series: "Here, if". Because if you look at the facts, then Vasilevsky was given 2 conquerors of the Crimea, 2 armies that took the Crimea and took Sevastopol. And with their help, in fact, he broke through to the Baltics.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. Well, as they say, practice is the criterion of truth. And since this event did not take place, fortunately, I think so.
A. ISAEV: Yes, it’s hard to say how it would have turned out. Because it was then, decades after the war, they said: "And we would have taken it." And what would actually happen? .. Although, indeed, the first clash in East Prussia, when the first Volkssturm, who was thrown into battle, he was simply captured. That is, having seen Soviet tanks, having seen the firepower of the Red Army, people simply surrendered, thought it good to surrender. So, perhaps, it could have been better, but in general, as in the famous anecdote: “And if they were included, the deceased would have taken more bribes. And it turned out so well. " In principle, yes, "Bagration" was and remains the largest defeat of the German army in its entire history.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, probably one of the most elegant and successful operations.
A. ISAEV: Yes, this is indeed a successful operation. It is difficult to call it graceful, because these are many small crushing blows - they so, slightly blur the eyes. And here we, I think, should stop at the losses. The figures of 300 thousand Germans of losses in "Bagration" are often cited. However - so I told on other previous programs about ten days, German reports on losses - and a very interesting picture can be seen from them. If you look at the data on September 30, that is, a month has passed since the "Bagration", then the losses of 4 German armies, which were hit by the "Bagration" - over 300 thousand. And if you count the same armies before December 31, when the front, in general, stood. There were some actions in the Baltics, but they were not so large-scale as to gain losses.
A. ISAEV: Yes, on December 31, 1944, the losses of 4 armies jump right up to 540 thousand. That is, in principle, a large amount of losses occurs from scratch.
D. ZAKHAROV: Why?
A. ISAEV: Calculations in hindsight. That is, they were counted, the real losses in Bagration were only in the fall. And not even just in the fall, in September - they were counted only by November-December. Therefore, we can say that according to German data, according to ten days, the losses are estimated at almost 500 thousand people. Some of them went missing ... Again, if you look from June 20 to December 31, and remembering that everything was quiet in the fall, almost 300 thousand people, 286 thousand people disappeared without a trace. This, again, is the data for ten days. Although, at first they gave much lower values, that they had only 140 thousand missing people.
D. ZAKHAROV: Missing persons. I think these are the ones that ended up in these boilers, and they went unaccounted for.
A. ISAEV: Yes, the missing are those who were surrounded, and those who then walked the streets of Moscow on July 17, 1944.
D. ZAKHAROV: How many prisoners were taken during the operation?
A. ISAEV: 150 thousand prisoners. And this figure, despite the fact that it is often said that the data on prisoners were overestimated for various reasons, it can be considered as quite similar to the truth and confirmed, one might say, by the fact that 57 thousand were driven through the streets of Moscow, already on July 17 ... That is, immediately after the surrender of the boiler near Minsk.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, here I probably need to say a few words about this march through the streets of Moscow, because we have literally 2 minutes left.
A. ISAEV: Yes, so I will say it as briefly as possible. The fact is that in the West, where things, in fact, were not going very well, they doubted that, indeed, such a great success would be achieved. And then they performed an operation called "The Big Waltz", it was then a popular American film. Since July 11, Moscow has brought together more than 57 thousand German prisoners at the hippodrome, at the Dynamo stadium. And on July 17, announcing in the morning newspapers and on the radio - they had not said anything to anyone in advance - they were chased away on a march along Tverskaya and along the Garden Ring. They, as it were, went from the hippodrome and the Dynamo stadium to Mayakovsky square, then they were divided into 2 streams, across the Crimean bridge. the Kanatchikovo station and the Kurskiy railway station. And this procession was led by 19 generals who were captured, and only they were shaven. That is, in the morning they fed everyone with breakfast, and only the generals were allowed to shave. And so they were followed by this mass of people who had previously fled from stormtroopers through the forests. They looked miserable enough. Because wandering through the woods for several weeks, under strong psychological pressure, when your comrades are constantly being mowed down next to you - this, I think, made an indelible impression on them for the rest of their lives.
D. ZAKHAROV: Well, yes. This concludes our today's program is drawing to a close. I thank my guest Alexey Isaev for participating in the program. Then we will continue to fight and push the enemy in subsequent releases of the program. And with you, dear listeners and viewers, I say goodbye for a week to continue the cycle of our programs. All the best.
A. ISAEV: Goodbye.
PORTRAIT BY TIKHON DZYADKO
T. DZYADKO: Sergei Sokolov is one of the last marshals of the Soviet Union and one of only a few people of this rank still living today. In the Great Patriotic War, he did not have enough stars from the sky - he was young and served in various positions on different fronts. Although, he ends the war already as a colonel - this rank was awarded to him in September 1943. After the war, a very usual gradual ascent up the career ladder. He became Marshal in 1978, at which time Sokolov was an Army General and First Deputy Defense Minister. He has already visited the leadership of the Moscow military district, as well as directly the commander of the Leningrad military district.
Marshal Sokolov is one of those people whose name is associated with the fighting in Afghanistan. He is one of the leaders of the actions of the Soviet troops. For 5 years, he has been at the head of the task force of the Ministry of Defense, which means that he is engaged in interaction between the Soviet and Afghan forces, in fact planning the conduct of hostilities by them. For this, already in 1980, he became a Hero of the Soviet Union, and his top career was the post of Minister of Defense, which Sokolov held in 1984. Takes only 3 years before Matthias Rust's famous flight, landing on Red Square.
Here, conspiracy theories are already in play - to what extent the failure of the air defense was accidental or was everything a clearly planned action to cleanse the Armed Forces. Be that as it may, but the fact is the fact: Sokolov is retired and becomes an adviser in the Ministry of Defense. Here is the harsh irony of fate.
For many, in the perception of the Sokols, these are Afghanistan and Matias Rust, the 2 largest failures of the Soviet army and the Armed Forces. All this clearly covers other, more glorious pages in his biography.